“The fool has said in his heart, “There is no God.” If this passage from Psalms is correct, then many people today are fools, for they insist that God does not exist. But the ranks of non-believers include many scientifically minded and highly intelligent people, not the sort we would normally consider as foolish. So, what makes such a person a “fool,” and not merely someone with whom we disagree?Well, let’s begin with a look at the definition of “fool,” which includes “a person who has been tricked or deceived into appearing or acting silly or stupid.” Now, sometimes we trick ourselves, and thereby make fools of ourselves. And other times we are misled. But either way, most would agree that someone who holds contradictory views has deceived himself. Imagine a person proudly proclaiming that the prime rib he is about to eat is an important part of his vegetarian diet. Or the person who says that the only medicine that can save him is the one with no ingredients.
But sometimes contradictions aren’t as obvious. Why, then, is it a contradiction to insist there is no God? It doesn’t appear to be contradictory - at first glance anyway. For the answer to that question, we are indebted to St. Anselm of Canterbury, who lived and pondered these questions some ten centuries ago. I can’t do justice to Anselm’s argument in this brief piece, but perhaps some concepts borrowed from Anselm may help make the point.
The first requires consideration of just what the mind does. Anyone who has seen a baby develop realizes that the human mind comes preprogrammed with an “operating system” of sorts. This allows us to acquire language, to reason, to recognize concepts such as fairness and truth and beauty, and other intangible things, and to make use of imagination. This ability for abstract thought lends itself to “got it” moments, when a problem that has been puzzling us all of a sudden makes sense. We all use these systems intuitively; of course there is no other way, since we could never use reason, for instance, to prove the validity or usefulness of reason.
One aspect of this ability for abstract thought is the ability to conceptualize. Food, for instance, can encompass a million different things, but to qualify it must be edible and serve to nourish, and not poison, us. We can call an ash tray “food”, but the underlying thing is not a matter of what we call it, but of what it consists.
So, with this observation in view, consider for a moment not what a definition of God might be, but what the conception of God is. What is it that we are struggling to grasp when we use that term? Anselm’s definition was simply this – God is that being a greater than which cannot be conceived. Whatever attributes God would have – omnipotence, omnipresence, perfect goodness, etc. – if you can conceive of a being with all those attributes plus an additional one, then the latter would be God. So, imagine two beings then – each with exhaustive, infinite powers. One of the two has the attribute of necessary existence, while the other may or may not exist. Clearly, the former – the one with necessary existence – would be the greater. Consequently, to fully conceive of God, we must be conceiving of a Being who can’t not exist, whose existence must always have been and will always continue to be. Anything else simply cannot fit the conception of God.
So, what does that prove? Maybe this conception of God is imaginary. Not so, Anselm would contend. And here’s why: the mind is not capable of conceptualizing something that does not correspond to something real. Now, this premise is a bit harder to get one’s mind around. The normal response to this part of the argument is that we create imaginary things all the time, from unicorns to tooth fairies to Jedi Knights. But each of these things, while imaginary, is the combining of things that are real: a horse and a horn; a person with wings and unusual powers; a warrior with special abilities and unusual weapons. And, moreover, neither a unicorn nor a tooth fairy nor a Jedi Knight would possess the attribute of necessary existence. If a unicorn did exist, it would have to consist of a horse with a single horn in its head; but its existence could have occurred briefly in the distant past, or could arise in the distant future or could not occur at all. We can fully conceptualize such a creature without the need that the creature itself actually exist, because the conceptualization does not require necessary existence.
This concept of “necessary” existence is not easily grasped at first. Many skeptics will contend that “existence” is not an attribute at all. Imaginary things don’t actually exist, they will say, so they consist of nothing. This line of argument can quickly devolve into an argument over definitions, with the skeptic insisting that it is nonsensical to consider a thing which does not exist. This assumption allows them to defeat Anselm’s argument – they write “necessary existence” out of the set of characteristics of God – but a moment’s reflection should reveal that this comes at too high a price. I can conceive in my mind of many past historical figures whose attributes I can describe in detail but who do not presently exist, for they have passed away. More importantly, every scientific discovery or invention must first begin in the mind of a person who sees the attributes of the thing before it actually takes form. The automobile, for instance, did not create itself; it first appeared in the mind of an inventor who could see what it would consist of if it did exist, and then set about adding “existence” to its attributes.
Letting our minds approach the concept of what “God” must be, the only way to conceptualize Him is as a necessarily existent being. If we are not seeing Him that way – if we are insisting that they may be a God, but then again maybe not, then are not yet thinking about God, but about something lesser.
This foray into philosophy can be difficult. Fortunately, there are many other proofs for God’s existence, ones much easier with which to grapple, but this one stands out for its elegance. For if it has merit, then God has embedded within us the means to find Him in the one place we have exclusive and special access to: our very minds.
If Anselm is right, then the fool who denies God is saying something like “I believe that the Being who must necessarily exist does not exist.” A rather foolish thing to say, when you see it clearly.
The Bible says that God has written his law on our heart. Perhaps if we probe a bit deeper still, we can also begin to see in its depths the first faint scratching of His signature.
10 comments:
@Al:
(1) You claim that "the mind is not capable of conceptualizing something that does not correspond to something real". Could you please explain how the following concepts relate to something real:
-> a circle?
-> a methodology to trisect an angle using compass and straightedge?
-> the truth value of: "This sentence is false"?
-> the Bible's world view concept of 'firmament'?
-> a device that measures the position/momentum of an electron with more accuracy than permitted by Heisenberg’s uncertainty principle?
-> a 'God Number', which I define to be 'that integer a greater than which cannot be conceived'?
(2) Combinations of attributes may not be logically possible. You mention omnipotence, omnipresence, perfect goodness, and necessary existence, but what makes you think that it is possible for all of these attributes to occur in a single being?
(3) My 'God Number' definition is in the same form as Anselm's 'God' definition. Following your logic, imagine two numbers, each infinite in size. One of the two has the attribute of necessary existence, while the other may or may not exist. Clearly the former would be the greater... and so must exist. However, we know that a 'God Number' does not exist. What makes you think that Anselm's 'God' proof is any more plausible?
mcp:
(1) Circles are real; they exist as concepts in the mind, as do the rules of geometry. Real things are not only physical things.
“This sentence is false” is an example of a nonsensical stringing together of words. Word s exist, and can be strung together randomly or incorrectly.
Similarly, ideas and concepts can be mistaken, positing incorrectly that they conform to reality when they do not. The mind is capable of sorting this out, which is why both our minds recognize that your example sentence has no meaning.
The Biblical language of the “firmament” is metaphorical. It is not a scientific text.
I’m not sure what to tell you about the device you mention, as it makes no sense to me.
There is no such number. One can always be added to an integer. Your definition therefore becomes a contradiction. It departs from what reason dictates regarding numbers.
(2) Because it is self-evidence that a perfect being must necessarily encompass all perfections. Any identifiable imperfection would prevent him from being perfect. I suppose you would have to demonstrate why a conflict exists before I would have to concede that no such being could possibly exist. The attributes you list do not appear to be inconsistent.
(3) Yes, your God number is in the same form. Anselm’s challenger posited a “perfect island” - an“island a greater than which cannot be conceived.” Both challenges misunderstand would Anselm was arguing. There is nothing about an island, or a number, which allows it to fit that definition, i.e. which require it to have necessary existence. It is like defining an ashtray to be food. The conception of food is not altered regardless of the things which are not food that I “call” food. So too here. There is no such thing as a number of infinite size, and all possible numbers have existence. There is no such thing as a number which may or may not exist. Anselm’s proof is more plausible because it is consistent with reason and does not depart from it in the way you are suggesting with your number examples.
Does this help?
Al
@Al:
All I was trying to demonstrate with my examples was that it is possible for someone to conceive of something that is impossible, without being aware that it is impossible. Please help me understand why you believe it is not possible for anyone to do that.
Al said: “There is nothing about an island, or a number, which allows it to fit that definition, i.e. which require it to have necessary existence”
Not sure what you are getting at here, but why is ‘God’ as defined by Anselm any more necessarily existent than my God Number? Anselm is saying: “we have beings, there must be a greatest being”. But why not also: “we have islands, there must be a greatest island”? And “we have numbers, there must be a greatest number”?
mcp:
I think the problem is in what is meant by “impossible.” If I know something to be impossible, then my conception of it includes that feature. But it may simply be that something is presently impossible, or impossible by technologies or methods available to us today.
By contrast, if a person believes something to be possible when it is in fact impossible, then they are mistaken. I do not dispute that people are capable of making mistakes, mental and otherwise. The premise is that we are not capable of a conception that does not correspond to reality. So, returning to the “perfect island” analogy of Anselm’s original challenger, I would say that his conception is mistaken – perfection is a conception and islands are a conception, but trying to merge them into a single “perfect island” is like insisting that square circles exist. The challenger does not really think that there is a “perfect island,” or that such a thing is possible, because “perfection” is not an attribute of islands. When we move to the conception of God, the opposite is true: if I say I am conceiving of Superman as God, it is obvious that I am not understanding – purposely or otherwise – what “God” entails. However, powerful, Superman was a created being with limitations. God is that being that created all other beings and that has no limitations. Insisting on conceptions one knows to be mistaken does not disprove the premise.
There may well be a “greatest” island, if you first define how you will compare them. But it would be nonsensical to refer to the island as the greatest conceivable being (unless perhaps if you are a fan of Lost.) So too with the God number; one can always add one to any number, so that no maximal number exists. These examples are quite different than the conception of God.
Al said: “These examples are quite different than the conception of God”
I don’t think you have demonstrated WHY they are different, other than effectively saying that FOR YOU a greatest being concept makes sense, but greatest island and greatest number and perhaps greatest anything else concepts do not make sense.
mcp:
Yes, precisely. I think we can probably agree that an infinite island that always existed and created everything is nonsensical; so too for a number. Neither islands nor numbers possess these attributes.
But God is a different conception. He must have maximal attributes; otherwise I am “defining” terms to mean something different than the conception that is actually in my mind. Perhaps you should tell me what conceptions you have of “God.” The word must conjure some image in your mind as to what is being referred to: what would that be?
A greatest island and greatest number both make the same amount of sense to me as a greatest being (depending on how you define ‘greatest’).
Al said: “tell me what conceptions you have of “God.””
Normally when I hear the term ‘God’, I think of the God described in the Bible as modified by my understanding of what some sort of consensus of Christians think about him. When hearing the term ‘God’ in a philosophical discussion, I think of an all-powerful, all-good, all-just, all-knowing, present-everywhere, eternal being. I am unable to conceive of either of these ‘Gods’ actually existing, since I think the combination of attributes does not make logical sense.
However, I can conceive of an existent, very-powerful, very-good, very-knowing, present-many-places being.
mcp:
It’s not a question of how you define “great.” What we are working with here are conceptions. I can define the “greatest” island as the one having the best personality or the island that tells the funniest jokes. Then I could start comparing islands. The problem is that nothing in the conception of island would include “personality” or “joke-telling.” Positing an infinitely great island is similarly nonsensical.
The philosophical conception of God you provided includes necessary existence. You say that this combination does not make logical sense, but it is the combination that all our minds – including yours apparently - naturally reach when you consider the conception of God. When you see that these attributes are not in conflict, there will be nothing to prevent you from recognizing that God must be.
So, perhaps you can list your main objections to the logical consistency of these attributes.
Al said: “It’s not a question of how you define “great.””
Of course it is a question of how you define ‘great’. The greatest island (probably) doesn’t have a personality or tell jokes. Just as the greatest being (probably) doesn’t have feathers or a tail. In your conception, does the greatest possible being have a mass? (All the beings I have come across have a mass). Describing a greatest anything is nonsensical unless you define what you mean by ‘great’.
Al said: “The philosophical conception of God you provided includes necessary existence.”
Not as far as I am concerned. Just conceiving of the greatest possible anything does not make that thing necessarily exist in reality (I appreciate that Anselm’s flawed argument attempts to make this conclusion).
Al said: “it is the combination that all our minds – including yours apparently - naturally reach when you consider the conception of God.”
There’s nothing ‘natural’ about this at all, it is simply a definition that philosophers often use. Historically, people did not think of gods necessarily having any of those attributes, and they certainly didn’t think the greatest existent god had all the attributes.
Al said: “perhaps you can list your main objections to the logical consistency of these attributes”
I would struggle to answer this in a brief comment here. I’ll have a think about it…
mcp:
I fear we're ending where we began: it is not a matter of definitions, it is a matter of conceptions. You can insist that "god" can mean something less than a maximally great being, but the simple process of comparison - which is closer to the conception of God? - is sufficient to show that conceptions are at play. "Defining" an island as having a personality, or defining "god" as having limitations, can of course be done, but the lie is apparent to anyone examining the discussion. An honest assessment of what is meant by "God," if it is to mean anything and not simply be a false definition made for the sake of defining, will include necessary existence, for the reasons Anselm set forth a thousand years ago.
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