Many skeptics reject the Christian faith because they assume that miracles are
impossible. Since the core of Christian
belief is that Jesus was crucified, died and rose bodily from the dead, and
since such resurrection events are miraculous, the skeptic concludes - before
considering any evidence - that the resurrection did not occur.
When pressed as to what they mean, the skeptic will often
say that resurrections are “physically impossible,” by which they mean that
they violate the laws of nature or, more specifically, of physics. Dead bodies
remain dead. They don’t transmute themselves into living bodies with
super-human characteristics. This is an appeal to experience, and generally
speaking, a valid way of “knowing” things.
What is not valid thinking, however, is to insist that miracles cannot occur. Such reasoning is circular
– the skeptic decides whether the claim that a particular miracle occurred is true
by simply restating that it did not occur, because its occurrence was not
possible.
Let’s take an example to get a closer look at what this
presupposition of impossibility looks like. Imagine an elder from a primitive
tribe on some remote island. Encountering Western civilization for the first
time, he is brought to an airport and he personally witnesses an airplane
taking off and landing. He is allowed to examine the plane. He probes the metal
of the skin, the rubber of the tires, and smells the chemical odor of the jet
fuel. He pushes against it, convincing himself that it is solid and real, and
more importantly, that it is heavier than
air. Yet he witnesses it flying. The
laws of nature as he knows them – that inanimate things that are heavier than
air cannot fly – have been violated.
He returns to his island and begins to describe what he has
seen. The leading villagers, also
well-grounded in the laws of nature, suspect that he is mistaken, or worse yet,
delusional. No amount of argumentation – of witnessing
- will satisfy them. The “laws” are clear:
inanimate things that are heavier than air cannot fly. What the elder has described is a metal
object that is heavier than air. Therefore, it did not fly. Nothing has ever flown that was not either
living, or if not living, then lighter than air. What could be simpler?
From our perspective, of course, we see the flaw in the
villagers’ thinking. They assume that the laws of nature are proscriptive,
rather than descriptive. They think the laws actively prevent flying, as if
keeping things on the ground was a goal the laws sought to enforce. We know
that the laws are descriptive and we
know that our ability to understand them is limited. More precisely, we know that our ability to
accurately describe these laws – these limitations on the behavior of things –
is incomplete. What would we tell the villagers? We would probably say, “You’re
right, as far as it goes, but you lack understanding of other ‘laws.’’ What you
need to make things fly are: 1) information and 2) power. Information includes
other laws of physics, such as the law of lift, otherwise known as Bernoulli’s
principle. And you need power; in this
case, the chemical power of combustion that generates thrust in a jet engine.
Properly harness that power, and filter it through the intelligence of information,
and you will control flight.
We, of course, are not primitive tribesmen. Science has
provided us tremendous knowledge and has unlocked many of the mysteries of
power and its production. But our scientific knowledge is not unlimited. With
time will come access to more information about how life works, about how
bodies and brains and minds are united and infused with life. With more knowledge will come access to
greater and greater amounts of power, perhaps allowing us to one day achieve
things that would seem impossible to us today.
And perhaps not. We may never find the means to reverse
aging, or to revive the dead. But if we can do certain things through the use
of intelligence and power, then how much more can the Creator of this universe
do? Does it not stand to reason that with infinite intelligence and infinite
power, he could just as easily raise a man from the dead and give him a
modified eternal body, as he could create and populate the Earth?
The skeptic who denies the possibility of a miracle is in an
odd position. Thinking himself modern and enlightened, he actually more closely
resembles the villagers. They insist that what they know is all that can be known;
that what they think can occur is all that actually can occur. So, confronted
with the first-person account of the elder, they will conclude that some other naturalistic explanation must be
true. They will suspect that he is
somehow mistaken, at best, or delusional or dishonest, at worst. They will
insist that his testimony be disregarded, because the probability of
“improbable” things is zero. And they
will be wrong, of course; victims of their own limited imagination.
The modern skeptic need not fear - accepting that miracles are possible will not force him to embrace Christianity. Far from it. The
case for Christ can only be made after
the possibility of miracles is acknowledged.
But insisting on presuppositions that limit our acquisition of knowledge
is not a particularly effective way of getting to the truth. And in the end, isn’t that what we all are
seeking?

21 comments:
Al,
Thanks for the post. I gather from the timing and from your reference to physical impossibility that it was inspired in part by my comments in the other post. So I hope you don't mind that I write some more remarks here.
The thing is, I'm having a really hard time understanding your point. You complain that the skeptic thinks miracles are physically impossible, but don't you agree with the skeptic about that? Or do you think that when Jesus, say, changed water into wine, he was just using some kind of advanced technology compatible with the laws of physics? It seems to me that most Christians think Jesus violated the laws of physics when he healed the sick, changed water into wine, etc. And you appear to agree that this is at least sometimes the case with miracles. Remember, you wrote (in the comments to the other post):
"Miracles...reflect a departure from what we understand the laws of nature to be. They may be genuine departures (as in a resurrection), or they may reflect a lack of complete knowledge on our part (as when a person recovers from a 'terminal' illness)."
But a "genuine departure" from the laws of physics is just what we mean by physical impossibility! So in the case of the Resurrection at least, you seem to agree that it really is physically impossible. It's not as if God used some kind of advanced technology to reanimate Jesus corpse---no, God deliberately violated the laws of physics when he raised Jesus from the dead, i.e. he did what is physically impossible.
If we all agree the miracles of Jesus are physically impossible, I don't see why you should complain about skeptics using that premise to argue against their occurrence. I mean, it seems to me a pretty darn relevant concern that the miracles of Jesus violate the laws of physics! And I explained why in the comments of the other post: For we depend on the very same laws of physics you think were violated to interpret the evidence you think supports your position. In other words, by insisting that "genuine" miracles occurred, you undermine the principles of evidence you need to justify your conclusion. (This was illustrated by the wizard and ink-crawling hypotheses.)
Now, you might object that while miracles are physically impossible, nevertheless God is omnipotent and hence can perform physically impossible feats. And you would be correct---God is omnipotent, and he can violate the laws of physics if he likes. So the skeptic agrees with you there. In philosophical-speak, we say that miracles are metaphysically or (as I prefer) broadly logically possible.
So I guess I just wonder if you recognize our agreement on these points. We both agree that the miracles of Jesus are physically impossible. We also agree that the miracles of Jesus are nevertheless broadly logically possible. Do you recognize this? Or do you still insist that the miracles of Jesus are physically possible, i.e. that they do not really violate the laws of physics?
But if you recognize this agreement, then what is the point of your post? Can you concisely state your thesis for me?
Regards,
Ben
I came to your blog from a link on John Barron’s site.
It seems he wants to reference you to reinforce his position and I’d like to ask you the same thing I asked him about supernatural phenomena.
It seems as though the thrust of your post here addresses the level of knowledge of the person witnessing the alleged miracle.
You live in a “natural” world, yet you assert the existence of supernatural occurrences. If you’re going to make that claim, you’re going to have to back it up. How can you claim to have any knowledge of supernatural events that occur outside our knowledge of the natural world?
zqtx:
I’m not sure what your question is. My post is meant to show that we lack complete knowledge regarding the laws of nature. Consequently, it is not accurate to say that a resurrection is impossible. If one rules this out on the basis of what he “knows” to be the laws of nature, then he is not really examining the evidence to see where it leads. He is engaging in circular reasoning and will end up where he began.
You say that I live in a “natural” world, but this is your assertion, not mine. Consequently, the burden is on you to establish it. I live in a world governed by natural laws for which there seem to be some exceptions, such as: the development of DNA, the beginning of life, the development of life, the emergence of consciousness. Additionally, I am aware of conceptions that have no physical dimensions. Ideas generally fall into this category. I am aware of mathematical conceptions, such as calculus, which make no sense to me apart from the existence of an intelligent and transcendent source in which these ideas are grounded. Yet they are not physical things and therefore not part of the natural world. I am aware that morality exists and is real, although I cannot find it in the natural world.
So, while I do not expect to encounter violations or departures from the natural laws, I do not foreclose that possibility. That was the point of my post.
Ben:
If you believe that miracles are possible, then we are in agreement. If you prefer to refer to this as “metaphysically “possible, I have no objection. However, the point of your comments seems to be that the resurrection did not occur because resurrections are impossible. So, I am a bit confused by your comments.
Perhaps you can clarify what your disagreement is. At this point, it seems that you would like me to use the physical/metaphysical distinction that you are drawing. I don’t, because my apologetics efforts are not addressed to academic philosophers, and nuanced distinctions like you are drawing have not proven useful in the past.
Feel free to explain what difference you see. If we are in agreement, it would seem that you would understand the point of my post, which I will restate: miracles are possible. Therefore, it is circular and fallacious reasoning to conclude that the resurrection could not have happened, despite the evidence for it, because resurrections are not possible.
I hope this helps.
Al
Al,
Okay, well that does help clarify things, thanks.
You asked me to explain just what our disagreement is. I promise to do that, but before I do, let me first see if I can clarify what our disagreement is not:
1. We both (I think) agree that the miracles of Jesus violate the laws of physics. In other words, we both agree that the miracles of Jesus are physically impossible.
2. We both agree that the physical impossibility of miracles poses no obstacle to God. In particular, it is broadly logically possible that God raised Jesus from the dead, and that Jesus performed the miracles described in the NT.
3. We both agree that the following arguments are circular: "Resurrections are not broadly logically (resp. physically) possible, therefore it is broadly logically (resp. physically) impossible that the Resurrection happened."
Okay, so there are some points of agreement. But how about disagreement? Well, you APPEAR to disagree with me on the following points:
4. The following argument is compelling (and certainly not circular!): "Resurrections are physically impossible, and so ancient documents will not help us determine that the Resurrection occurred."
5. There is no evidence for the Resurrection.
(Please note in #4 and 5 that I do NOT take the position that the Resurrection did not occur---it may have! My position instead is that we cannot reasonably conclude that it occurred, because there is no evidence for its occurrence. In other words, we must remain agnostic on the subject.)
6. Interpreted under broad logical possibility, the first sentence of your post is false---it is not true that many skeptics reject the Christian faith because they assume that miracles are broadly logically impossible. Indeed every skeptic I've ever met who has discussed the subject with me has agreed that miracles are broadly logically possible.
I'm quite willing to defend #4 and 5 if you like, but for now let me just talk about #6. I suspect that you have misinterpreted skeptical criticisms of Christianity as engaging in circular reasononing as a direct result of refusing to countenance the distinction between physical and broad logical possibility. I bet what happened is that you encountered skeptics who made arguments similar to the one in #4 above, and because you don't distinguish between different senses of possibility, you misinterpreted those arguments as something from #3.
Now, I appreciate the fact that you're not writing to academic philosophers here, but this distinction between different kinds of possibility is not something that emerged from philosophy departments in academia. Philosophers just slapped labels on terms between which a distinction already existed in natural language. Using these labels allows us to be clear about what we mean, and avoid miscommunications such as has occurred between us over the last few days.
I also appreciate that you want to keep things as simple as possible. I share this desire. But it will not do to oversimplify things. Like it or not, the distinction between physical and broad logical possibility is quite real, and it makes a difference in the way we interpret certain skeptical arguments. If you refuse to acknowledge that distinction when engaging arguments that explicitly depend on it, you're going to run into a lot of trouble.
Regards,
Ben
Al,
My apologies for any confusion. Please let me try again.
It sounds like you’re trying to side-step any statement you would need to defend about the resurrection by implying that the resurrection would comply with the laws of nature, but we just don’t understand how it works yet. That would be defined as the argument from ignorance. Do you treat all supernatural claims this way?
There is nothing supernatural about DNA, the development of life, consciousness and the philosophical concepts of mathematics and morality. Things need not be physical to be natural. Emotions and feelings are not physical, yet they’re still natural.
You seem reject the premise that you live in a natural world that complies with the laws of nature. How can you claim to have any knowledge outside the natural world?
For Jesus to violate the laws of physics, would that not mean that the laws of physics are something outside of God's control and he is bound by them.
The "laws of Physics" are just a description of how nature acts when God allows them to act on their own. They are not an overriding thing that controls what God can and cannot do. As such God cannot "violate" the laws of physics. He can cause things to happen, which woould not happen without his intervention.
Hi Trent.
When folks talk about the laws of physics being "violated," that just means something happens which is contrary to the laws of physics. But the laws are still descriptive, not prescriptive.
So God can violate the laws of physics in the sense that he can cause something to happen which is contrary to the laws of physics. So for instance, one of the laws of physics is that particles cannot travel faster than the speed of light. But God can cause a particle to travel faster than the speed of light if he likes. And if he did that, then he would be violating the laws of physics.
Regards,
Ben
zqtx
I think you are missing my point. If by DNA, you mean the component amino acids, then I will agree that DNA is natural. I was referring to the information content of DNA. Highly complex and specific, it codes for the production of billions of cells which act in unison to accomplish a purpose. Anytime we see such order (such as in computer programming), we realize that an intelligent agent is at work. With no plausible naturalistic explanation for the information rich content of DNA, I am justified in concluding the intelligence behind it is “super” natural. You then make a category error in equating emotions and feelings, on the one hand, with life, consciousness, math and morality on the other. Emotions and feelings are descriptors for how living animals react to their environment. They are a product of an already fully functioning being. Yes, they are not “physical” but they are the product of physical things, such as brain and nerve cells. Life arose for reasons that cannot be explained, and self conscious intelligence is orders of magnitude more perplexing. Concepts such as those involved in calculus are not products of emotion or feeling. They do not change, and therefore must somehow be grounded outside of the minds of men that have access to them. Otherwise, your calculus could be different than mine, just as your emotions are. But calculus isn’t something that’s dependent on my emotional or physical state. Finally, morality is the universal recognition by human beings that there is a law that we should be adhering to, and that brings guilt when we become aware that we have not. In short, it is a message from somewhere that we should act a certain way. Messages require a source, and since nature cannot come up with a source, I am again justified in concluding that this source is transcendent.
I hope this gives you some indication of how I can conclude that there is a realm beyond nature. It strikes me as self-evident, once you think about the inadequacy of the explanation for how these things came to be. This does not tell me much about the nature of that realm. For that, I would need a source of information. The Bible provides that source, and its authentication derives from the evidence of the resurrection, as a supernatural event is just the kind of proof that one would expect from a supernatural source. And that is how I can claim to have some knowledge outside the natural world.
Ben,
You are right that Item 4 is not circular. It is a non-sequitur. The only way we will know whether a resurrection occurred (assuming we don’t see it ourselves) is if someone witnesses it and tells us about it. The ancient documents which reflect such witness accounts do not themselves need to be supernatural. This is a premise that you do not support. It sounds as if you believe that supernatural events can only be proven by supernatural evidence; if so, you are back to being circular in your reasoning. At the very least, you will need to support that premise.
Item 5 is simply false. Evidence consists of the statement of witnesses and the physical artifacts left at the scene. If a person testified that they saw Jesus alive, watched him being removed dead from the cross, and then interacted with him shortly thereafter, that would constitute evidence. There is abundant evidence of the resurrection. You may choose to disbelieve what they said, but whether you believe it or not, it would count as evidence. Perhaps you should define what you mean by the word evidence.
I’m not sure what to make of Item 6. Your view seems to be that skeptics believe miracles could happen, by divine intervention (broad logical), but that they are otherwise “physically” impossible. They also believe there is no divine intervenor. So, what they give with the one hand they take away with the other. The net result is that they believe a miracle can never occur because they are impossible, which of course is what I have been saying. So, the issue is not my inability to distinguish between “physical” and “broad logical” types of impossibility. The issue is that skeptics reject the existence of a God who could do the work of overcoming physical impossibility, and again, the net result is the same. They do not believe a miracle can occur.
I’m still wondering what your bottom line is: you believe that there is no intervenor and therefore no possibility of a miracle, because miracles are otherwise impossible – is that correct?
Al
Al,
I have spent the last several days trying to explain the inference in #4. So for you to just dismiss it as a "non-sequitur" is pretty disappointing. Needless to say, it's not a nonsequitur at all, but rather supported by all the argumentation in this comment thread and the other.
#5 follows from #4, along with the observation that the would-be evidence for the Resurrection is pretty much limited to ancient documents and other stuff like ancient documents (insofar as it also depends on the laws of physics for proper interpretation).
Moving on, you wrote:
"Your view seems to be that skeptics believe miracles could happen, by divine intervention (broad logical), but that they are otherwise 'physically' impossible. They also believe there is no divine intervenor. So, what they give with the one hand they take away with the other. The net result is that they believe a miracle can never occur because they are impossible, which of course is what I have been saying."
But this does not follow. Yes, it is true that some atheists (not me by the way) deny the existence of God, and so in that narrow sense they think miracles are impossible. But they don't necessarily bring that belief to the table when they assess the evidence. Most of the time, they acknowledge the possibility that they are wrong, that God exists, and has in fact performed miracles in history, and they consider that possibility when approaching the would-be evidence.
On the other hand, they do bring their knowledge of the laws of physics to the table, and this is quite enough to undermine the evidential support which Christians want to marshal for various historical miracles.
You continue:
"you believe that there is no intervenor and therefore no possibility of a miracle, because miracles are otherwise impossible – is that correct?"
No! That is certainly not correct! I am an agnostic (AKA negative atheist) on the subject of God's existence.
Now, there are some people who are positive atheists, and they do deny the existence of your "intervenor." However it does not follow for them that there is no possibility for a miracle to occur. Namely, they are free to consider the possibility that they are mistaken about the nonexistence of God.
Very few positive atheists think they could not possibly be mistaken about their positive atheism.
But as for myself, I am a negative atheist, which essentially amounts to being an agnostic.
Regards,
Ben
Ben,
I think the reason you may be an agnostic is that you seem to be unwilling to actually assess the evidence without bringing to it the presupposition that miracles do not occur. I'm not sure how else to approach this. Perhaps the question to put to you is: why else have you rejected the cumulative case for Christianity other than your presupposition that "physically impossible" things never occur and therefore the Biblical accounts must be false?
Do you not see that the circularity of your reasoning is preventing you from reaching a conclusion? Agnoticism does not seem to be a very satisfying resting point, as our minds were constructed to assess evidence and reach conclusions, not to be perpetually indifferent to things.
That's my view anyway. Thanks again for the dialogue.
Al
Al,
One of the biggest problems we have faced in our conversation over the past several days is that I simply do not hold the various positions you attribute to me. For example, you wrote:
"...you seem to be unwilling to actually assess the evidence without bringing to it the presupposition that miracles do not occur"
But this is incorrect on two counts. First, I do assess the would-be evidence, and so far I've concluded that it is not actually evidence. That you disagree with this assessment does not change the fact that it is an assessment. Second, I don't even believe that miracles never occur, much less presuppose it. I have already expressed my openness to miracles in the other comment thread when I noted that "Maybe dead bodies do reanimate from time to time, when God wishes it to be so."
The problem isn't that miracles definitely don't occur. Rather, the problem is that we have no reason or evidence in support of their occurrence.
You continue:
"Agnosticism does not seem to be a very satisfying resting point, as our minds were constructed to assess evidence and reach conclusions, not to be perpetually indifferent to things."
Agnosticism does not entail indifference! On the contrary, I've spent a great deal of time engaging the would-be evidence you've suggested, and explaining in as careful terms as I can why I don't think it supports your conclusions.
Now let me answer some of your questions. You ask:
"why else have you rejected the cumulative case for Christianity other than your presupposition that 'physically impossible' things never occur and therefore the Biblical accounts must be false?"
But I don't take the position that the Biblical accounts are false. I'm an agnostic, remember? The Biblical accounts might be true or they might be false---I don't know which.
Instead, I've rejected the so-called cumulative case for Christianity because I don't observe any such accumulation of evidence. Indeed I can't find any evidence for the existence of God, the miracles of Jesus, etc.
"Do you not see that the circularity of your reasoning is preventing you from reaching a conclusion?"
No, I don't. The circularity you think you see depends on me holding a position I do not actually hold---namely, that miracles do not occur and/or have not occurred. On the contrary, I fully acknowledge the miracles may have occurred and may still be occurring.
The problem is, we have no evidence for or against their occurrence, and so we must remain agnostic on the issue. And the so-called evidence you think you have is not actually evidence.
Regards,
Ben
Ben,
We seem to be having two versions of the same conversation with Al here.
Much of what we are attributed in thinking is not what we are saying. Al is essentially pointing the finger and blaming us for not accepting his would-be evidence while he presupposes the position that there exists a deity in the first place. This presupposition simply credits this deity for anything that cannot be understood or unproven. In other words, where science may say “we just don’t know based on the evidence”, he concludes that a god must be responsible and tries to introduce testimonial evidence that’s not really evidence at all.
If you look at the reply to my question, he merely asserts knowledge outside the natural world based on his presupposition based on complexity and transcendence. It’s all one big exercise in circular logic and flawed thinking. One simply tries to justify the other while incorporating a transcendental argument and an argument from ignorance.
What I find ironic is the name of the blog – it implies that someone here is genuinely interested in the discussion, yet has already reached an unwavering conclusion. The question is really how to break this cycle.
zqtx,
I don't think Al is presupposing the existence of God. Rather, he is attempting to employ an inference to the best explanation.
Regards,
Ben
Ben:
I'm not sure if you appreciate the irony of your statement. To say something is "not actually evidence" means you are not considering it for any probative purpose. Perhaps you mean something different by that, but I understand you to mean that you have "disqualified" it as "evidence" and therefore, in the end, you're not considering it.
The reason or evidence to support believing in miracles would be the eye witness accounts of those who experienced them. This constitutes "evidence." It may not be believed, or it may be mistaken, but it is evidence.
So, when you say "I can't find any evidence for the existence of God, etc." you are making a comment about your presuppositions (or perhaps your unusual definitino of "evidence," but you are not making a case against the believabiility of Christianity.
In the end, the circularity of your reasoning is pretty apparent: you don't "see" and "evidence" (whatever that means) so naturally your conclusion must be that Christianity has not been proven.
I'm suggesting that you examine the accounts and the historical record the way you would for determining facts about any historical event and then form a conclusion.
zqtx:
I'm not presupposing that God exists. I'm drawing an inference from the evidence. At a crime scene, I would have to determine whether the death of the victim is attributable to an accident or an agent. I don't presupposed that there is a killer; I conclude that, for instance, the knife sticking out of the victim's back supports the inference that a killer must be there, that the crime was not accidental. We draw inferences all the time. When it comes to creation, the existence of such things as life, fine-tuning, morality, something rather than nothing all scream out to the person considering them that there must be a creator. This is the result of abductive reasoning - reasoning to the best explanation -and is not a presupposition.
My reasoning may be mistaken, but it is not circular. If it is mistaken, you should point out how, but I'd look for a reason other than circularity.
The way to break the cycle might be to better define your terms. You and Ben both seem to have an unusual view of what "evidence" is, as you feel free to reject these historical sources as "non" evidence.
zqtx:
I'm not presupposing that God exists. I'm drawing an inference from the evidence. At a crime scene, I would have to determine whether the death of the victim is attributable to an accident or an agent. I don't presupposed that there is a killer; I conclude that, for instance, the knife sticking out of the victim's back supports the inference that a killer must be there, that the crime was not accidental. We draw inferences all the time. When it comes to creation, the existence of such things as life, fine-tuning, morality, something rather than nothing all scream out to the person considering them that there must be a creator. This is the result of abductive reasoning - reasoning to the best explanation -and is not a presupposition.
My reasoning may be mistaken, but it is not circular. If it is mistaken, you should point out how, but I'd look for a reason other than circularity.
The way to break the cycle might be to better define your terms. You and Ben both seem to have an unusual view of what "evidence" is, as you feel free to reject these historical sources as "non" evidence.
Al,
When I say that the historical data is "not actually evidence," I mean that it doesn't do the sort of work evidence is meant to do---namely, it doesn't raise the likelihood of the proposition in question (e.g. "Jesus was raised from the dead by God") being true. But I'm certainly not saying that I have failed to take your would-be evidence into account. On the contrary, I'm happy to consider the historical data, including the New Testament documents, Jewish archaeology, the writings of the Apostolic Fathers, etc. And I'm quite willing to weigh various hypotheses to see if one of them stands out as a "best explanation." Unfortunately for the apologist, no miracle hypothesis stands out in this way, and that's why I think it's inappropriate to call the historical data "evidence" for such miracles.
Also, you have repeated the claim that I have some kind of presuppositions which lead me into circularity. At first you thought I was presupposing that physically impossible things never occur, but as I explained (again) in my last comment, that charge is false---I do not know one way or the other whether physically impossible things occur. Maybe they do. Yet despite this correction, you have continued to insist in your most recent response that yes, I do have some kind of problematic presuppositions. Okay, well what are they?
Oh, and what is the circular argument you think I'm making? It's not #3, as you initially suggested. So what do you think it is now?
Regards,
Ben
Ben:
Thanks againf for the dialogue. I guess my sense is that you moved from what appeared to be a pre-supposition - miracles can't happen - to a position of doubt - maybe they happen I just don't know. I think agnosticism tries to dress up as intellectually rigorous what is, in the final analysis, a simple refusal to go where the evidence leads. So, when I hear people say that they are open to the evidence, but then re-catergorize as "non evidence" a multi faceted case that has persuaded untold millions of people over the years, I suspect that they are engaging in circular reasoning. In other words, the historical accounts don't become "non evidence" because I am led to conclude that a supernatural explanation best fits all the pieces.
Non evidence is something that would lack any probative value. An artifact left at a crime scene would be non evidence, as would be a criminalist finding no latent prints. Witness accounts, such as the gospels, would count as evidence, even if a person were ultimately to conclude that they were false or otherwise contrived. I can't simply call things I don't agree with "non evidence."
In any case, I appreciate you weighing in and will give you the last word.
Thanks.
Al
Al,
I don't know how you could think those things after all I've written. I've explained in careful detail why the so-called evidence for the Resurrection (and other miracles) doesn't hold up. I've offered competing hypotheses (a wizard, ink-crawling) which have as much going for them as your Resurrection hypothesis, and I've offered an argument to show why the Resurrection hypothesis isn't any better than those---namely, that we don't have any higher-order framework of understanding the world in which we can adjudicate between competing paranormal hypotheses.
Now, maybe you disagree with my conclusions. Fine---that's something we can talk about, if you're interested. But if you're not interested, then just say so. You don't need to pretend I haven't offered an argument and accuse me instead of "a simple refusal to go where the evidence leads."
You wrote:
"So, when I hear people say that they are open to the evidence, but then re-catergorize as "non evidence" a multi faceted case that has persuaded untold millions of people over the years, I suspect that they are engaging in circular reasoning."
There are at least two big problems with this statement. First, this business of using historical data as evidence independent of faith to show that the Resurrection (or other miracles) occurred is a relatively recent development in Christian apologetics, and I see little indication that it has very many adherents, much less "untold millions." And even for those adherents, the vast majority of them no doubt believed long before they did any historical research. On the other hand, there are some people out there who have been persuaded by the evidence. But then there are also people who read the Koran and become convinced that it is a miraculous text which could not have possibly been written by human hands working alone. I don't feel any pressure to conform to such baseless opinions.
Second, recall that I asked you in my last comment, what is the circular argument you think I'm making? In your response, it seems like you acknowledge that you haven't actually any detected any particular circularity, but you nevertheless suspect that there must be some circularity lurking somewhere in my reasoning, because you can't fathom how else I would have reached a conclusion opposite to yours. But this is just to ignore the arguments I've made over the last few days, especially the main argument about how we have no way to adjudicate between competing paranormal hypotheses. If only you considered my arguments, it would I think become clear to you why I have reached the conclusions I have.
You also wrote:
"I can't simply call things I don't agree with 'non evidence.'"
But that's not what I've done. I already explained in my previous comment why I don't regard the historical data as evidence for miracles: They don't do the job evidence is supposed to do, which is to improve the likelihood of the proposition(s) in question. So for instance, the New Testament documents don't give us any reason whatsoever to prefer the Resurrection hypothesis to other competing paranormal hypotheses.
Anyway, I think the bottom line here is that you're not interested in directly engaging my main argument. That's not necessarily a bad thing; we have limited time and motivation, and we have to choose what we will let occupy our attention. If my argument doesn't make the cut, so to speak, then that's fine---I can understand that. But to the extent that you're not willing to consider my argument, you're not really in a position to criticize it.
Regards,
Ben
Post a Comment