This resulted in some dialogue regarding a perceived flaw in
Anselm’s approach. Anselm’s view of God was, in short, that if He does exist,
he must necessarily be “that being a greater than which cannot be conceived (or
GCB, as a shorthand reference to the Greatest Conceivable Being). From this conception, one comes to realize
that a starting point for beginning to make sense of the notion of “God” is to constantly
test whether the being in your present understanding is indeed greater than all
other possible beings. This led Anselm to compare a being with contingent
existence – a God who might possibly exist – to a being which must necessarily
exist. Of course, the latter must be God, as such a being is greater than a contingent or possibly non-existent being. All of this made sense to Anselm
because he assumed that the mind can only conceive of “real” things.
Here was the challenger’s position:Regarding Anselm’s assumption that the mind can only conceive of “real” things. Why believe this is true? I can “conceive” of unicorns, griffons, orcs, etc. But they do not exist. Given this, we must either claim that either mythical creatures are “real” in some sense, or that I am “imagining”, rather than “conceiving”. The question, then, would be how we would know Anselm wasn’t “imagining” the GCB.
What Anselm meant by “real” was roughly “conforming to reality.” He did not mean that there were no such things as imagination or imaginary things, living or not. Consequently, for the examples provided, Anselm would have no difficulty with a unicorn, as a horse with a horn, a grifon, a winged animal with certain powers, or an orc, a humanoid type being. Whether actually currently existing, or imaginary, these things consist of real things – bodies, horns, wings, etc. – assembled in new, different or imaginary ways.
There is an important next step however. Let’s consider the unicorn. Perhaps it once existed, perhaps it exists somewhere in the world or in the universe, or perhaps it will someday come into existence. These possibilities appear when I begin to conceive of a “unicorn.” I can recognize it as imaginary, also. But what is clear to me is that such a being does not have, as one of its attributes, the quality of “necessary existence.” There is nothing about a unicorn that requires me to understand that, if there were such a life form, it must necessarily exist. I realize that at most it is a contingent being, a being which may exist only in the imagination. To this, the typical challenger to Anselm would say, “well, I am imagining a unicorn that does necessarily exist, some sort of “god-unicorn.” But this gets us nowhere. Again, imagination is simply that; in this case, it involves the imaginer combining two things that don’t go together, roughly similar to the imaginer saying that he is thinking of a square circle. Mere words, with no corresponding reality. One can think of a unicorn, and one can think of a limitless being that has necessary existence, but one realizes that the two are not the same.
To conceive of God,
by contrast, necessarily requires that we view God as eternal, always existing,
and never possibly ceasing to exist. That is the essence of God-ness. Anselm
was not imagining the GCB. He was, by contrast, allowing the inborn processes
of his mind to inform him as to what followed logically from the conception. His
contribution, I believe, was in realizing where logic and reason inexorably
led: perhaps there isn’t a God, he began, but if there is one, he would have to be….
Included in this list was necessary and eternal/everlasting existence. But if
this is true, Anselm intuited, then the mere recognition of the possibility of
God’s existence – which most everyone will acknowledge – leads logically to the
necessary conclusion that he must therefore exist.
The challenger's next point:
Also, “logic and reason” do not tell us that God must be unlimited. In fact, being unlimited would automatically place God outside the domain of logic and reason. When considering we have no actual “concept” of an unlimited being, it would seem that an unlimited being *cannot* be the GCB. We can only “conceive” of things that our minds can comprehend. To comprehend, we use logic and reason. A God that can be comprehended by logic and reason would obviously be limited by these rational constraints. Thus, this Being would be limited.
This argument is based on an assertion that if God could be
comprehended by logic and reason, this would create a limitation upon him. The conclusion
is based, I believe, on two mistaken assumptions: the first is that the writer seems to
think I mean to say that we, as humans, can fully comprehend God. I do not
think that this is the case. By analogy, I can know things about nuclear power
that are accurate without being able to fully comprehend nuclear power. The
second is that logic and reason somehow stand outside of God, boxing in his
options. Logic and reason are manifestations of his nature, not limitations
upon it. God does not submit himself to logic and reason; they emanate from his
nature. Consequently, recognizing that God’s nature is logical and reasonable are
descriptions of God; they do not limit him.
Finally:Finally, it would seem that if you are to “ground” the reliability of the mind in an Anselm-ian notion of God’s goodness, then you are arguing circularly. After all, if Anselm *assumed* that we can only conceive of real things, then moved on to “prove” God’s goodness, then the very thing you are trying to ground was assumed in the argument.
This last point is interesting. If I understand it correctly, the assertion is that first, I am assuming that the mind is grounded in a good God, and then I conclude using that mind that God must be good. I think this is a fair point. The problem is that it is like one saying, “you claim that logic and reason are good tools for arriving at truth; now prove it.” But I would have to use logic and reason to “prove” anything, so this too would be considered circular. No, I would say, by contrast, that these are starting points. I must intuitively recognize that logic and reason are programs that my mind came “pre-loaded” with and that I cannot reach behind or beyond that. Similarly here. But what is the alternative? If God is a great deceiver who has tricked us into thinking that “bad” is actually “good,” I could never know that this was the case.
And so, I conclude that a being possessing that much power
would not create minds for the simple purpose of deceiving them into thinking
that what they perceive around them is actually the opposite of what it really
is. He made us personal beings because he too is personal, and he wants us to
eventually find relationship with him. That’s why relationship is so important
to all of us. We were built that way for a reason. But relationships built on dishonesty and deception make sense
only when the one so inclined believes he can benefit from the deception. As a
limitless being, God gains nothing from deceiving us. He is the source of all,
and we have nothing that he wants – other than our free will freely directed toward,
and not away, from him.
If reason can lead me anywhere, here it leads me to the conclusion that such a
being would act in conformance with his nature. A personal and trustworthy being, he equipped us to respond in kind.
Posts
37 comments:
Al,
Regarding the unicorn: I would agree that nobody really considers the unicorn to have “necessary existence”. But I CAN conceive of it in such a way. The question is: should I? Merely asserting that they don’t go together is question-begging.
Likewise, with God/GCB, we CAN conceive of God as having necessary existence, but it is obvious that not everyone has had such a conception. So why should they? Anselm would say that it is because God is the GCB. But again, not everyone has had such a conception of God, so why should they conceive of God in such a fashion? For Anselm, it was just obviously the case that God is the GCB - but certainly this is nothing that He *discovered*. It was his definition of God, his starting point. Again, I would hold that we cannot define things into existence. Stating that “if God exists, He exists necessarily” does not prove God’s existence, much less anything else about God, because it is still a conditional statement.
And we still have not removed subjectivity from the equation. It is not obvious to me why a being that can exist is inferior to a being MUST exist. It is obvious that a being who exists is greater than a being who doesn’t, but that isn’t the same thing.
Nor have we addressed the question of what the difference is between conceiving and imagining. You would say that I am imagining a unicorn, because although my “concepts” are real (horse, horn, etc.), they don’t “go together”. But how are we to know that in the first place? The concepts of “God” and “necessary existence” and “goodness” might be real, but that doesn’t mean they go together.
You state that “To conceive of God... necessarily requires that we view God as eternal, always existing, and never possibly ceasing to exist.” How is this not either begging the question, or a mere act of definition? Again, it is clear that not everyone views God this way. Therefore, you would have to claim that these people aren’t “really” conceiving of God. But how do you know this? You don’t; you’re simply trumping via definition.
It is one thing to conceive of something a certain way. It is quite another to assert that everyone MUST conceive of it in the same way, or they’re wrong.
Regarding a “limitless” being:
My argumentation on this was misguided, I later realized. The “Greatest Conceivable Being” tag while useful for its brevity, is actually not accurate. Technically, Anselm defined God as “that which no greater being can be conceived”. The GCB label implies that we must be able to actually conceive of the being, whereas the formal definition provided by Anselm does not – only that we cannot conceive of something greater.
Now, I could argue that this definition/conception still does not entail infinite capabilities. I would claim that there is a point where “really powerful” or “really knowledgeable” becomes the ceiling on which we are capable of conceiving, and no greater can be conceived beyond that. This is because I simply cannot conceive of what a limitless being would “look like”, so to speak, and so it can be legitimately said, I think, that there is a point where something is so uber-great that we would not be able to conceive of it being stronger. But, I will simply have to admit that I do not think I have the philosophical wherewithal to develop that more rigorously.
Regarding circularity:
I’m not sure we understand the problem the same. Earlier, you were attempting to ground the reliability of the mind in God’s goodness. The argument could go like this:
1. If God is good, he would have created reliable minds
2. God is good.
3. Therefore, God created reliable minds.
Now, I already have a problem with #1, which is related to how we develop theodicies. I don’t think you’ve sufficiently addressed that concern, but nevertheless, let’s move to #2: “God is good” is obviously an assertion in need of some justification. Presumably, it would be justified somewhat like the following:
A. God is that Being of which no greater can be conceived.
B. I cannot conceive of a Being greater than a Being who has infinite goodness
C. Therefore, God is infinitely good.
The problem is that there is an unspoken assumption to #4, and that is that the mind is reliable. Or, as you have phrased it, that we can only conceive of “real” things. So, if we were to nest the argument as follows:
1. If God is good, he would have created reliable minds
2. God is good.
– [assumption]- we can only conceive of “real” things (i.e. our minds are reliable)
a. God is that Being of which no greater can be conceived.
b. I cannot conceive of a Being greater than a Being who has infinite goodness
c. Therefore, God is infinitely good.
3. Therefore, God created reliable minds.
The phrasing of the assumption and #3 might be different, but the spirit is obviously the same. In fact, I’d claim that Anselm’s assumption is far stronger than the conclusion, rendering it superfluous.
Hopefully, this makes it clear that I’m not arguing that the reliability of the mind is simply self-referential in the way that the reliability of logic would be. No, I’m claiming that trying to ground the reliability of the mind in God’s goodness – if using Anselm’s assumptions! – is a circular argument. In order to avoid the circularity, you'd have to concede that we can conceive false things. But in so doing, obviously the "concept" of the GCB is rendered questionable.
You state: ‘If God is a great deceiver who has tricked us into thinking that “bad” is actually “good,” I could never know that this was the case.’ That is true, but you would know it is a possibility. And that is why trying to ground the reliability of the mind in the goodness of God would be problematic. Simply preferring a good God over a bad one does nothing to establish a “ground” for the reliability of the mind.
JB:
The point is you really can’t conceive of a unicorn as having necessary existence, unless you are simply using your imagination to come up with an imaginary being. This is because you know intuitively that only one being can have necessary and eternal existence. All other beings must necessarily be subordinate to this greatest conceivable being.
I would say that those who do not have Anselm’s conception have simply not given the matter enough thought.
“Defining God”
Most critiques of Anselm involved him “defining” God. That’s why I used the food example. If I say food is the word I use for metal ash trays, then I can conclude that a particular ash tray is food. That is an example of using a definition in a circular manner. But the conception of food transcends a definition. If the ash tray is not edible and does not provide nourishment, it is not within the conception of food. Saying that some people might still view it as food is nonsensical; it is an abandonment of reason. By the same token, imagining a “god” who lacks something is nonsensical, and reflects that the thinker has not allowed his reason to operate properly. Such a person may insist that they are imagining God as, for instance, a winged animal with telepathic powers. That is their God. But that shows they do not yet understand the conception behind the word. They are incorrectly forcing a definition where it does not belong. If their winged animal is “god,” then what would you call a being which is still greater? One that pre-existed your “god” or who called it into existence? You can label it any way you want, but the process of reasoning takes you further and further, until you realize, through the use of your reason and logic, that only one being can be the true “God” – that being a greater than which cannot possibly be conceived.
Anselm’s discovery, I think, was in making the connection between “possibly existing” and necessarily existing. Since most people will acknowledge the former, Anselm then uses that to show that the latter must also be true.
Our Limitations on Conceiving of the Infinite
Your point about our being unable to fully conceive of God is something with which I agree. Again, the analogy would be to things like nuclear power or computers. I can understand generally what their capabilities involve even though I can’t fully understand or describe them. But my inability to do so does not place a limit on their capabilities; it is instead a reflection of my limitation.
Grounding the Reliability of the Mind
You say that trying to ground the reliability of the mind in God’s goodness is circular. It is, as I’ve conceded, in the same way that grounding all of our decision-making on the reliability of logic and reason is. If we don’t first start with that assumption –i.e. that logic and reason are reliable tools – we can never get there, because we must use logic and reason to arrive at sound conclusions. If I don’t first start with the assumption that the mind is reliable, then my conclusion that the mind is not reliable collapses, since that conclusion can only be trusted if I first assume the mind’s reliability. That would be circular.
So, again, my reasoning goes like this: deception is only employed as a means to acquire a desired object or end; an infinite being has no need to acquire anything; therefore, an infinite being does not use deception. That’s why the mind is reliable; because I know intuitively that it must be and if it isn’t, then I can’t know anything.
As to your final point, yes I realize that it is possible that God is deceiving me. But I reject this possibility as unreasonable, as it makes no sense that a God who has no needs would use deception to obtain something from me. In human experience, it is apparent that deception is used when a limited being is seeking to obtain something of value that someone else possesses and is using deception to achieve that end. A being with no needs would have no reason to do that. A being with infinite intelligence would not act contrary to reason. Consequently, I have no reason to suspect that God is deceiving me.
JB is right. You cannot simply poof beings into existence merely by dint of their nonexistence being inconceivable- unless you imagine that what you cannot conceive is somehow binding on the Universe.
Even if God is presumed to be the highest example of beings thus poofed into existence by the Ontological Argument, there are an infinite number of lesser but still great beings likewise made flesh.
For instance, the Ice Cream Sundae that could Eat Chicago. Any ice cream sundae without this power is obviously not the greatest conceivable, and the greatest conceivable Ice Cream Sundae cannot be conceived not to exist. And it could obviously eat Chicago. If it wanted to.
Anselm's Ontological Argument is a good example of what happens when people think that the relationships between words are more important that what we observe to happen in the real world. Elegant, but content-free.
Zilch,
I think the other alternative is that you have not grasped what Anselm was getting at. He was not playing with his imagination, conjuring beings into existence or imagining ice cream sundae monsters.
I’ll leave it to any readers to decide whether a counter-example such as the one you provide is worth discussing. What I think it shows is that you are viewing this in precisely the manner you suggest I am – as the mere stringing of words together.
Anselm, by contrast, asked himself the question, “what is it the mind conceives of when it thinks about God?” “Why does that notion – of an all-powerful, eternal creator being – occur to me at?” “What conclusions can I draw using reason regarding what attributes this being must have?” In so doing, he found answers that appear (to me anyway) to have been embedded with the fabric – the natural processes – of the normal functioning human mind. In a sense, he found God’s signature in his handiwork, not writ with pen or stylus, but etched into nature of ideas themselves.
Elegant, yes, but also content rich.
Al,
Again, with the ash tray analogy, what one person considers “poison” can, to another, be nourishment. There are people in this world that can digest metal, which no one but those people would have considered “food”. This is why what exists in your mind as obvious cannot be held to be reality. This is why what one person considers “greater” (in terms of quality, not quantity) cannot necessarily be considered objective.
To claim that a “necessary being is greater than contingent being” is a subjective argument. To claim that a good God is greater than a bad God is a subjective argument. To build God around preferences like this is subjective and anthromorphic.
To claim that someone’s concept of “God” as a winged animal is deficient because it isn’t the GCB is obviously question-begging. Why can’t we claim that the person has used these mystic, inner cognitive processes to “conceive” of this Being as “God”? If the reply simply boils down to “you’re wrong, because you disagree”, I think you can begin to see the problem, because the winged-animal adherent can obviously just resort to the same tactic.
There are reasonable people in this world that have not conceived of God in the same way. For someone who would hold that concepts = reality position, this should not sit well, because either you must maintain intellectual arrogance (“they simply have not thought enough – or good enough”) or admit the possibility that what you thought was conception was actually imagination/definition.
I’d agree that Anselm’s genius was observing that if a necessary being can possibly exist, then – by definition – that Being must exist. The question, then, is if “necessary existence” is actually real (conceived), or if it was imagined/defined; and/or whether it being an attribute of God's existence is real or not.
Al, re: circular reasoning & the reliability of the mind
You are essentially stating that no arguments can be made without making the assumption Anselm made, or without assuming the general reliability of the mind. I think this is obviously false. I would assert instead, that we cannot make logical arguments without assuming the reliability of logic, not the mind.
In fact, it is precisely because of this that we would use logic to check the reliability of the mind. If someone seems to suffer from faulty decision-making or gullibility, we would probably advise them to think more rationally or take a critical thinking class.
Al, you stated:
“A being with infinite intelligence would not act contrary to reason.”
This, to me, does not follow. Perhaps you can elaborate on this a bit more? It seems to me that stating one knows what a Being with infinite intelligence would or wouldn’t do is fairly presumptuous. But, of course, one cannot state that a Being *could not* do so, because that would be placing limitations on its ability.
Consider also: a being with no limitations is already contrary to reason. No limitations means there are no rules, which means that no logical rules apply. So, such a being could do, or even be, mutually exclusive things. This defies logic. I could be wrong, but I do believe this was Descartes’ conception of God.
Al- again, what JB said. I agree that the words line up logically the way Anselm defines and uses them. But that doesn't mean that the definitions necessarily refer to anything that exists outside our thoughts. In fact, I agree with what you said: God exists in thoughts, and there are logical strings of words that lead one to believe in some sort of supreme essence.
But heaping up superlatives and saying that anything that great must also possess existence is simply wordplay, and is not binding on the real world. The Ice Cream Sundae sounds flippant, but it has the exact same logical right to existence as any godhead, on Anselm's argument.
Logic is a useful, indeed an indispensable tool, but it alone cannot call entities into existence.
Zilch,
You are correct that logic can neither call things into existence nor bind the real world. A mistaken premise, for instance, will lead to a mistaken conclusion, even though the logic is sound.
This was not what Anselm was doing. Anselm began with the premise that we can only conceive of things which are “real.” This is grounded in our intuitive understanding of how the mind works. He then realized that for the conception of “god” to make any sense rationally, it would need to encompass a being a greater than which cannot be conceived. This is often the stumbling block for challengers, but again it makes intuitive sense. He then realized that if it were even possible for such a being to exist, it would have to have, as a necessary characteristic, actual existence. Since all rational people realize that it is at least possible that God exists, Anselm concluded that he must necessarily exist.
Many committed believers don’t like this argument, and I do not use it in discussions with non-believers, as arguments from morality, design, the existence of anything, cosmology are much more powerful. I find Anselm’s formulation fascinating, however, because 1) I never in a million years would have thought of it on my own, 2) I view it as the great “Artist” signing his name on the canvas of our minds. I think that is very cool.
JB
You may disagree with my examples, but the concepts are sound. There is no doubt we could find things that no one could digest or things that could be digested but provide no nourishment. Neither would be food. Finding exceptions is actually the point, as forming the conceptions allow us to eventually categorize the specific examples.
Claiming that the winged animal is deficient is not question-begging. I’m relying on your adhering to reason and logic and not simply exercising your right to disagree. No rational person would conclude that a limited winged creature is the greatest conceivable being because to do so would be to state a contradiction: “I believe that the limited winged being is an unlimited being” or “I believe that a created winged being is the creator of all things.” You’re free of course to do so, but the content will have no meaning.
You are right that these discussions risk moving to a position that sounds intellectually arrogant. That may be. But telling the computer engineer, for instance, that she is arrogant when she tells me I don’t fully grasp how the computer works would not be helpful. Perhaps Anselm (and I) are wrong, but simply pointing out that it may sound arrogant to hold a definite position does not advance the argument.
You ask why I say that a being with infinite intelligence would not act contrary to reason. What does it mean to act contrary to reason? To hold a position that is irrational, or to act in a way that is inconsistent with a reasoned or rational way to act. Why would someone do this? Because he lacked adequate intelligence to recognize his folly or because, despite recognizing his mistake, thought it nonetheless in his best interest to do so. Either move would be inconsistent with infinite intelligence, which would not lack knowledge or judgment or wisdom. With perfect knowledge, adherence to rationality would also be perfect.
You say it is obviously false that we cannot make arguments without assuming the reliability of the mind. You say instead that we must assume the reliability of logic. But I can only assume the reliability of logic by using my mind to consider logic, as well as what it means to assume and what it means to be reliable. Logic is a tool of the mind. If the mind is unreliable, everything emanating from it is also unreliable. If a scale is improperly calibrated, the result it reaches will not be accurate, even if the mechanism is otherwise functioning.
It is not placing limits on a being to describe its nature. God does not act illogically because that is inconsistent with his nature. It is not a limitation on him; he does not secretly wish that he could be illogical, but somehow lacks the power. What we see as illogic is apparent to us because logic and reason are grounded in his very nature. By analogy, the only way we could see that a line is crooked is by comparing it to a straight line. If the straight line were crooked, it would no longer be a line.
That’s why your next point is incorrect. A being with no limitations is capable of all things that can be done; accomplishing contradictory things is illogical, and therefore inconsistent with his nature. He cannot create a rock too big for him to lift because such stringing of words together are irrational and incoherent. These things we recognize as limitations are not things that box him in, or limit his powers; they are descriptions of his nature.
Al- you agree that logic cannot call anything into existence. But that's exactly what the Ontological Argument purports to do. It starts with the unexamined premise that there's such a thing as "necessary existence", and that it's a characteristic of a being or whatever. This undermines the whole argument. Existence is not a "characteristic" of something: things that don't exist don't have characteristics- or in the case of unicorns and such, merely have imagined characteristics. So you can't bootstrap a God (or an Ice Cream Sundae) into existence by simply saying you can't conceive of such a Being (or Sundae) without existence.
The Ontological Argument is elegant, yes, but circular.
Zilch,
You proceed from the false premise that the argument calls something into existence. Unspoken in that is that “it” (whatever it is) does not exist until the moment that I realize I cannot conceive of it not existing. You conclude- rightly- that reality does not operate this way. The problem is in your premise, not in the logic you employ. Your premise is inward focused, as if the mind were the source or creator of the thing in question.
Take, for example, the quadratic equation. There was a time on Earth at which it was true to say that no human mind had ever conceived it. Thousands of years ago, some minds began to manipulate mathematical concepts until they reasoned their way to it. Today, it has many practical uses in, for instance, industry and construction. It continues to be used because it accurately describes reality, and allows a road builder, for instance, to figure out differences in elevation when a road is built through hills.
It was not called into existence when the first mind encountered it, and it did not fail to exist prior to that point. The minds in question simply accessed reality, using tools and programs that were natural features of their minds, and made discoveries about that reality. They didn’t create math or reason, and these features of reality would not cease to exist even if every human mind forgot about them.
You say that “existence is not a characteristic of something,” and here I think you are mistaken. Imagine a dog breeder who envisions a particular mixture of dog features that he hopes to achieve through selective breeding. His plan his highly specific and will result in a very unusual dog, but the steps leading up to are numerous and uncertain. As he plots out his approach, and envisions 20 years down the road when it is complete, he envisions the creature that results. He describes in detail its characteristics, as projections of what he anticipates will occur in the preliminary steps. But he also recognizes that it may not work, for reasons beyond his control. The dog exists in his mind as a conception, and may well come to exist in reality if he is successful. The dog may not be able to breed, and so it may go out of existence in one generation. The dog’s existence is contingent, not necessary, and this is indeed a feature of it.
Al- your dog analogy does not show that "existence" is a "characteristic". A not (yet) existent dog is a concept. It is not a real dog that simply lacks the characteristic of existence: it is simply not a dog. Similarly, Anselm's imagined God is not a real God who simply lacks the characteristic of existence: He is simply a concept. A real concept, to be sure, but not a supernatural being. At least not by this argument.
Zilch,
And when the dog dies and no longer exists - is that an imaginary dog as well? I think there are a lot of dog owners out there who would recognize that "existence" is a characteristic. You may wish to view things as if only the present is real, but considering the movement of time, and the fact that things come into and out of existence, I think its pretty safe to say that "existence" is a characteristic.
We may just have to agree to disagree on this one.
Thanks.
Al
Al,
Finding exceptions in your “food “ analogy is not misguided in the sense that it shows the limitations of what you conceive of in your mind and how it correlates with the “real” world. I believe you are correct that we could find examples of something that nourishes no one – but we wouldn’t arrive at that through “conceiving”.
I think Anselm was correct that we can only “conceive” of real things in the sense that we lack the ability to generate completely novel ideas. I cannot create something out of nothing, so the ideas I generate essentially just shuffle existing information. So, as you pointed out with the unicorn, I’m still using “real” things to generate this idea, but I’m shuffling them in a way that doesn’t correspond with reality – therefore we call this “imagining”.
Again, the weakness of this argument lies in the difference between “conceiving” and “imagining”. Or, rather, the lack of a difference… Because the mental process is the same, it is only the result that is different. So, when Anselm states “I conceive of God as…”, it begs the question. Stating that we can only conceive of real things does not give one license to simply assign the label “conceive” to any mental process in order to bring about the object of that processes existence.
You say that Anselm does “show his work” in this sense. That is fair enough , I suppose. I cannot say otherwise, as I mentioned. I guess we’ve reached the point in the conversation, on this point at least, where I must simply read Anselm for myself. Nevertheless, it seems to me that if we cannot tell a priori whether or not a mental process is “conceiving” or “imagining”, then the ontological argument (or at least Anselm’s version of it) is on shaky ground. Otherwise, it is clearly possible that “necessary existence” simply shuffles some existing “concepts” around to form a new, but imaginary, idea.
Al,
Regarding the winged-animal “god”: I agree that no rational person would conclude that this “concept” would be the GCB. That is the whole point. The point is that not everyone conceives of God as the GCB. You would simply dismiss this idea as illogical because, well, God is supposed to be the GCB. You only “justify” this by the following:
- Pointing out the GCB is *your* concept of “God” (which would obviously be subjective)
- Asserting that the GCB *must* be the concept of “God” (which is begging the question, or simply definition)
- Asserting that GCB is the *only* concept of “God” (which would obviously be wrong).
Pointing out that we can conceive of some other “greater” being than a winged-animal god does not eliminate the winged-animal from consideration as “God”, unless we *define* it that way. We could just as easily state that whatever Being *may* exist as greater than the winged-animal god simply doesn’t – or if it does, it isn’t “God”. You may object to this by stating that it’s completely arbitrary and subjective – and you’d be right. And that, of course, is the whole point.
Perhaps you merely overlooked it, but I notice you did not engage me in pointing some flaw with “my” concept of God. This, to me, is where the arrogance becomes problematic. You are right that simply insisting one is right can make one *sound* arrogant, but that is not necessarily a bad thing – just a problem with perception. Dismissing others’ points of view as *wrong* based on nothing other than a different concept is, to me, arrogant – and obviously bad (non-)argumentation. To insist that if someone simply doesn’t share your concept of God that they’ve abandoned reason is ridiculous unless you can prove your claim.
There are numerous other ways to similarly conceptualize God: “The Most Supreme Being”, for example. Why isn’t that a valid concept for God? I can’t help but think it’s only because we can’t somehow squeeze necessary existence in to that as an entailed component.
Al, indulge me on another sidetrack, please….
RE: acting “contrary to reason”. You ask, “What does it mean to act contrary to reason?” I’d add to your suggestions another option: to act in a way that defies reason. For instance, creating something out of nothing would be an irrational act in that it defies reason. But it obviously does not follow that someone would have to lack something in order to do this.
I agree that it does not place limits on a Being to describe its nature. But if its nature is that it is rational, then the nature is limited. Reason places limits on things. For instance, we would say God cannot commit/create evil, because His nature is perfect and good, and He cannot go against His nature. Yet, I have the ability to sin. How is it that I have an ability that God does not, if God is unlimited? Clearly, it is something that can be done, and yet not by God.
Because a rational Being cannot go against His nature, there are limits imposed by this nature. Only an irrational and/or nature-less Being can be truly unlimited, but would obviously be incomprehensible.
Al,
I’d agree that if the mind is completely or generally UN-reliable, then we would have to consider “everything emanating from it” as unreliable. But is anyone arguing that we have to consider the mind as unreliable? All we are doing is attempting to ground its reliability. The reliability is an open question. So, I think it is problematic to state that if it’s circular to assume reliability, we must instead assume UN-reliability - and that doesn’t work either, so we must resort to the fallacious option, rather than the non-starter.
However, even if we think in terms of always assuming the reliability of mind when making a logical argument, the argument I outlined above would still be problematic. Because, before we’d even start we have this universally-agreed-upon assumption of mind reliability, but later on, we’d the unique Anselm-ian assumption. It double-dips into the reliability of the mind, so to speak. So, even if I were to grant that *any* argument proving the reliability of mind was circular in the sense that you mention, it still seems to me that the argument as I present has an extra degree of circularity, and so an extra problem.
It still is mind-boggling to me that you’d be comfortable with a logically fallacious argument. While it may be the case that we could not make such a circular argument on naturalism, I don’t see how one fallacious argument is better than a non-argument.
Al- when a dog dies, it still exists- as a dead dog. As it falls apart into increasingly smaller and wider spread bits, its matter continues to exist. It's dog-nature, of course, disperses.
To say that a dog exists means that a dog pattern in the waves of the world is recognizable, over a finite and fuzzily defined period of time. When do dogs differentiate from wolves, from bacteria, from starstuff, from primordial matter and/or law?
There are no hard boundaries to be drawn here. Our language doesn't always cut Nature at the joints, often because the joints don't exist in Nature. This is the basic reason I don't find Anselm's argument, as well as the ultimately related Kalam argument, convincing: they show how our words, taken to be absolute, can generate concepts, but they don't show that the word is also the thing.
I'll take the World over the Word: it's been around a lot longer.
Zilch,
I think you may be missing the point. A dog may be made up of molecules that are assembled and disassembled over time, but that does not mean that the dog is simply a pile of molecules, as if we were dealing with lego pieces that can be reshaped. Ask any dog owner. When a dog dies, it ceases to exist, regardless of the fact that the matter of which it consisted still exists. The simple fact is that dogs, like all living things, come into existence, live for a period of time, and go out of existence.
You say there are no hard boundaries to be drawn here, and in that I think you are mistaken. A life form – whether cat, dog or person – is an easily recognizable hard boundary. Have you never been bitten by a dog? That’s a pretty hard boundary, and not just a collection of molecules.
You conclude, it seems, with an assertion that this is simply words being strung together “generating” concepts, and in that too I believe you are mistaken. One, you obviously think that your words correctly define the way things really are, so it’s a bit contradictory for you to suggest otherwise. Two, words do not generate concepts but are instead the only means we have of reducing conceptions which exist in the mind to a form in which they can be communicated to others. I may be able to think in pictures or in ideas, but without a mechanism to transmit my thoughts to others, they would remain trapped within me. Words provide this function; they do not create the underlying thing, anymore than Anselm’s words created God. They simply describe what they perceive.
Thanks for weighing in.
Al
JB
You say there is no difference between “conceiving” and “imagining,” and in this I believe you are mistaken. When I imagine a unicorn, I construct it from various pieces available to me. I may combine a horse of a particular color with the ability to fly and a horn not normally associated with a horse. These constituent parts are conceptual, not imaginary. Otherwise, I would be unable to proceed. Let’s “imagine” that I equip the unicorn with a voltage meter and a turbo charger. I just plug them in, one on each side. See the problem? While the horn may work, because some animals have them, and flying may work, because some life forms fly, living beings don’t have batteries to test or combustion engines to enhance. As I try to imagine this new creature, I realize – conceptually – that it simply won’t work.
So, when Anselm “conceives” of God, he is in “receiving” mode. He is not painting a picture of what “his” god would look like, but seeing what reason leads him to.
As for the GCB not being a winged animal, you are incorrect in asserting that this is subjective. When you say that no rational person would so conclude, you are beginning to see what Anselm was doing. Yes, someone could insist nonetheless that this is their “god,” but they would either be delusional or dishonest. The winged animal, being limited, cannot also be unlimited (which any conception of God must necessarily include) without stating a contradiction. Consequently, holding to such a notion would be irrational.
As for the arrogance issue, I would say that arrogance is a function of the style of delivery. If confidence in one’s view is arrogance, debate would be limited to issues that no one was sure of. I’ll take your example: god is the “most supreme being.” What does this accomplish? I agree, let’s say. But you have to explain “supreme” so that it is clear to me. What does supreme look like? Better than all possible competing alternatives. In other words, “supreme” is simply a synonym for GCB.
Your next point related to “contrary to reason.” Your example of God being limited because he cannot sin will hopefully help clarify the point. You have the ability to sin because you are distinct from God. Through your thoughts and actions, you behave in ways that God finds displeasing; they violate his perfect will. We perceive this – understand this – as sin. God is the standard. His nature is the “straight line” against which our behavior is measured. When you wonder why God cannot commit evil, you presume that he would wish to have the power to change his nature in such as way that he would act against it. But the moment he directed his will to such an end, it would become his nature. He would no longer be acting against it. If you wish to view this as a “limitation,” you are imagining that there could be some greater being who could simultaneously will contrary things. You are elevating the laws of logic – here, the law of non-contradiction – to the level of a force above and beyond God. But if God did in fact possess the nature of “contradiction,” we would no longer see it as a problem, because that would then be the “true” nature of things. This line of thinking is absurd, and pointless, because that is not how nature is.
As for your final point, I’m not sure what “logically fallacious argument” you are referring to. Please specify.
Al- you say that a life form has hard boundaries. Does that mean that there is a picosecond where an animal is alive, and the next picosecond it's dead? That's not how it works, and that is well known. Sure, a dog that bites me is probably well within the limits of what we consider living, but the boundaries are necessarily diffuse.
Zilch,
I'm not sure what you're asking. My point was that we know that a dog is more than a collection of atoms or cells, even if we can't identify the precise moment when its life ends.
So, yes I do think that there are hard boundaries when it comes to life.
Al- you claim that life has hard and fast boundaries. But if you can't always say for certain if something is dead or alive, then there are no hard and fast boundaries.
And yes, a dog is more than a collection of atoms and molecules. It is a very highly ordered collection of atoms and molecules.
Zilch,
Yes, and poison is a set of molecules ordered differently than one finds in vitamins. A doubt you would have trouble recognize why the difference matters.
We're in perfect agreement here, Al.
Al,
I did not claim that there is no difference between “imagining” and “conceiving”. I claimed that there is no way to tell the difference to beforehand. At this point, the only distinction you’ve drawn between the two is that “imagining” combines “concepts” that do not go together. But how are we supposed to know this? How do I know, for instance, that there are no horses with wings? Likewise, do we *know* that a time machine is possible/impossible? Is this a “concept” or “imagination”? Do these concepts go together or not? There are numerous examples of what may have previously been considered “imagination” that became actual “concepts”. Surely it is possible for the opposite to be the case as well? But we won’t know until we can test the idea after the fact. Thus, merely assuming a cognitive process is reflective of reality by assigning it one label (“conceiving”) rather than another (“imagination”) is begging the question.
To try to work around the issue by asserting that Anselm would have been in “receiving” mode is, to me, no less than claiming special revelation. That obviously isn’t going to work either, because there simply is too long of a history of bogus revelatory claims. So while of course we may grant that *genuine* revelation should be reliable, it would remain an open question as to whether the revelation is genuine.
Al,
As for the Winged-Animal “god”, we are talking past each other, I think. I am stating that no rational person would conclude that this is the GCB, which proves that not everyone “conceives” of God in the same way. You are stating that because no one conceives of the Winged-Animal “god” as the GCB, therefore no one conceives of it as God. This is obviously imposing one person’s concept over another, and again begs the question – unless you can demonstrate why the GCB is a “better” concept. Assuming that because someone doesn’t end up with the same result as you or Anselm that therefore they are “imagining” or dishonest is hearkening back to the arrogance I brought up before.
To demonstrate this, I have asked you a couple times to poke holes in different concepts of God (like “Most Supreme Being”), to show why they are inferior to the GCB. You seem to have passed both times. It seems to me that lacking the ability to demonstrate why others concepts aren’t as rational or consistent with evidence and then simply insisting on another being “right” because someone “conceived” it is intellectually dishonest.
Al, re: the “most supreme being.” My apologies, it seems as if I originally missed where you did address this proposed “concept” (or was it “imagination”?).
You ask, “What does this accomplish?” Why does it need to accomplish anything other than to describe a concept of God? I would argue that if you are “conceiving” of something in order to accomplish something (which, by the way, is exactly what it seems Anselm was doing), then you are probably using motivated reasoning – like being able to attach “necessary existence” a property.
In any case, you argue that we need to define “Supreme”. I would agree, but I would note that this same problem exists for Anslem’s concept (which involves “greatness”). You assert that it would have to mean “Better than all possible competing alternatives.” But here I disagree. In order to be the “Most Supreme Being”, one only has to be “better” (whatever that means) than what actually exists. So, out of the set of all existing Beings, God is the “most Supreme” or “Greatest” of these beings.
This is obviously not the same as the GCB, because I am ignoring what can exist in my imagination, and considering only what exists. I think this is a much less problematic concept, as compared to trying to assert that what one holds in one’s mind also must hold in reality. It also strikes me as obviously true: if God is “God”, then He is the Greatest Existing Being (GEB).
Al,
If God cannot do something that is, in fact, possible to do, then He is limited. If God is truly omnipotent, with unlimited capabilities, then He should be able to do anything and everything. Yet we would say that He cannot cease to exist. Why? Because His existence is necessary. We’ve thus limited His omnipotence, and yet this is a contradiction. I would assume that we both agree that omnipotence is not something one can hold in degree.
Trying to skirt around this issue by appealing to God’s nature misses the point. We do not define omnipotence according to a Being’s nature, otherwise it is possible for any Being to be omnipotent, so long as it can do what is logically possible for it to do. Omnipotence, if it means anything, has to mean that a Being can do anything that is possible – not anything that is possible for it to do.
If I were to appeal to my own nature in order to claim that I am not limited by it, I am fairly certain you would say that this makes no sense. For instance, man is a fallen creature; we cannot be perfect. But I’m pretty sure that we would claim that this is a limitation of our nature. Therefore, we are limited by our nature.
God is likewise limited by any other properties we assign to Him, other than being “unlimited”. Stating that it’s not logically possible for God to do nonsense is to constrain God with rational properties. Trying to appeal to logical possibilities according to natures is not helpful here, unless we are consistent. If it is “nonsense” to say that God cannot create a stone heavier than He can lift (even though we can), then it is also nonsense (as opposed to “impossible”) to say that we can avoid death (even though God can). Thus, our finitude could not be construed as a limitation of our nature. But now I’ve just pointed out two key facets of our human nature (fallen-ness and finitude) that I think we would both accept are, in fact, limitations of our nature.
Al, you stated you weren’t sure what “logically fallacious argument” I was referring to. It was discussed a while ago, further up in the comments. Here it is again, somewhat revised:
- [A1]- Our minds are reliable
1. If God is good, he would have created reliable minds
(a). [inductive claim] Deception is only used to gain things that we lack
(b). God is unlimited, and so lacks nothing
(c). therefore, there is no reason for God to use deception to gain anything
2. God is good.
- [A2]- we can only conceive of “real” things (i.e. our minds are reliable)
(a). God is that Being of which no greater can be conceived.
(b). I cannot conceive of a Being greater than a Being who has infinite goodness
(c). Therefore, God is infinitely good.
3. Therefore, God created reliable minds.
Before I address the circular reasoning, let’s re-visit the deception issue. With Premise 1 above, we’ve established, essentially, that “God works in mysterious ways”. In other words, what often appears to us as “bad” is often (supposedly) working towards a greater good. With this in mind, I argued that it is difficult, if not impossible to justify Premise 1. You then supplied a-c as justification. I would argue that 1(b) is an equivocation. Just because God is unlimited, does not mean that He does not lack for anything. To demonstrate this, I used Creation as an example. Clearly, God created for a reason. Ostensibly, it was because He wanted something.
You counter-claimed that God could have created out of perfect love. But I don’t think this solves anything. God may have been perfectly unselfish in wanting to create, but nonetheless stands that He stands to gain something by it – even if it is to share us (He gains the ability to share with us). Furthermore, while I can grant that it is possible God creates out of perfect love, the fact of the matter is that this would be an exception to a very strong inductive claim: generally, things are created to gain something that was lacking, no? So, if we can appeal to God’s perfect love as an exception here, there’s no reason not to appeal to it as an exception to the deception rule. Thus, I still hold that Premise 1 is unjustified.
Al: re Premise 2 above...
We return to the issue of circular reasoning. I claimed that if we’re trying to ground the reliability of our minds, then it is problematic to assume that they are reliable. You counter-claimed that we have to do this in order to reason. So, in essence, if the classical theist is guilty of circular reasoning here, then so is anyone else trying to ground the reliability of mind.
I still claim that it is not necessary to assume reliability of mind, only reliability of logic. In fact, I think it is obvious that we assume the reliability of logic as a check against the mind. This is similar to a calculator. I don’t have to assume the reliability of my arithmetic ability in order to use a calculator, in fact, I might be using a calculator for the opposite reason. Now, you may counter with the observation that in order to use a calculator you do need some mathematical ability, much in the same way that we would need somewhat reliable mental faculties to reason. After all, if I think I’m pressing 5, but really hitting 3 on a calculator, I cannot expect a reliable answer, and yet I do.
Therefore, I can at least grant that there is a degree of mental reliability in -[A1]- that we have to grant in order to reason (or use a calculator). But I think it should be obvious that this is not to the same degree to which we are trying to ground the reliability of mind (as reflected in 3). I think even you would grant that naturalism has no problems grounding the ability to recognize numbers and press them on a calculator. This level of mental faculty is not what we’re after. Rather, it seems we are trying to ground something far more similar to what is assumed in -[A2]-, and this is why there is a circularity problem.
While it *may* be true that anyone attempting to ground reliability of mind has to assume a certain level of what they’re trying to prove, it seems to me that the specificity of what is being assumed in -[A2]- changes the game. It is obvious that others have not bothered to assume what Anselm does (i.e., they would grant A1 but not A2, and it is in this way that I say the classical theist that assumes what he does is “double-dipping” into the reliability of mind in this argument. And so it is in this way that the classical theist encounters *an additional* circularity problem that others would not. I would at least hope you can concede we should try to minimize circularity.
JB
There is a way to tell the difference between imagining and conceiving. It requires that you move from abstract thinking – in which anything is possible and we can’t “know” anything – to practical examples. The conception “poison” is not imagination – it is that set of things that can harm the body. Within that, one can argue as to degree or type, but the general “concept” is knowable. I think we both know that you are not confused by this, as you would not take poison to cure a headache.
I did not claim that Anselm received “special” revelation. I asserted that what he articulated is available to every normally functioning mind. “Receiving mode” is just shorthand for the idea that Anselm was not labeling or naming things, but instead “seeing them” in his mind in conceptual form.
You ask that I “poke holes” in “most supreme being” but by doing so, you are again demonstrating that you are labeling or naming things, not trying to conceive of them. If a most supreme being has every possible attribute in a superlative way, then the being under consideration is that a greater than which cannot be conceived. You are simply giving it another label. If, on the other hand, your “most supreme being” lacks some attribute that another being possesses, that the being under consideration would not be God. There is nothing arrogant about this, unless by “arrogant” you mean possessing confidence in one’s views.
You say that “unlimited capabilities” should include the ability to cease to exist. You ground this in the assertion that a being must be capable of doing anything “possible,” even if that includes logical contradictions, like ceasing to exist or creating a square circle. Perhaps God can do those things. My point is that I am measuring God by a set of tools that I did not create, but I know I have – to wit: logic and reason. I have no other means of assessing these questions. Consequently, your question becomes irrelevant. You are asking me to do what human beings cannot do. What do the rocks look like on a planet circling Regulus? I don’t know, because I lack the means and the tools to view them. What does a square circle look like? Can God build one by manipulating the dimensions? Again, I don’t know because I lack the tools to access other dimensions. What I do know is that I have no good reason to believe that God does, or should be able to do, things which are logically incoherent. These conclusions reflect my limitations, as a human being; they do not constrain God. His nature is what emanates from him, not a greater force that limits him. Consequently, I reject your challenge as… yes, unreasonable.
As for your syllogism, I agree that it is circular. Of course, I didn’t write it, so I suppose I would have to view it as a straw man argument. Let’s start with your critique of what you label 1b. You view it as false because you say God created for a reason. However, this does not prove your point. God’s reason may not have been a “need.” God was equally content whether he created us or not; he did so only for our good, not his. Consequently, his reason was to allow us to experience eternity with him for totally selfless reasons. You say that he “nonetheless stands to gain something by it.” Perhaps, but unless he needed what he “gained,” (assuming that is even possible), it still remains a gift. Any example of a self-less gift would be analogous. A reason, then, does not create a “need.”
You assert: generally things are created to gain something that is lacking. True – for limited beings. We take resources that we didn’t create and modify them into forms that are useful to us. But this doesn’t apply to a being who created everything in the first place. You are viewing him as a human, “waking up” one day and wondering how he can make something of use to him. But on what basis should I view God that way?
I don’t understand how you can draw a distinction between the reliability of the mind and the reliability of logic. You say logic checks the mind. But logic stems from the mind. It is not separate and apart from it. It is the manifestation of the processes of a normally functioning mind.
I see that I will not persuade you as to Anselm’s premise regarding the mind’s capability. You view the argument as circular, while I view it as a necessary and intuitive recognition of how the mind works. You want me to “prove it.” But, as you know, it is not susceptible to proof, anymore than I can prove the reliability of logic and reason, since I would first have to use those tools to assess them. If you want to stop at that point, that’s fine, but I think that what Anselm did is far more interesting. Plumbing the depths of what the mind can conceive, he realized that one need not look to the heavens to find God. No, he is much, much closer, having left his indelible mark upon each of us.
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