Is nature all there is? Skeptics and atheists hold that
view. They want to make sense of what
they see around them by viewing it as a natural process, taking place over vast
periods of time and resulting in the incredible diversity and complexity that
we presently experience. The view has
some intuitive appeal – on the surface, anyway.
We all know that things change over time. On a massive scale, we see the
shift of the continents over the millennia and see how they once fit neatly
together, puzzle-like, before they began to drift. We recognize that living beings inherit the
traits of their parents and that modifications can occur over time. Anyone
familiar with dogs knows that selective breeding can bring changes. Even in the
area of the brain, as scientists probe deeper into its mysteries, it is
apparent that some of our behavior is influenced at a very basic, chemical
level. We read stories of accident victims whose personalities are altered by
an injury to the brain, and we all know the effects that drugs and alcohol routinely
have on one’s thinking, and behavior.
But this surface appeal does not bear much scrutiny. First,
and foremost, resting one’s “faith” on nature as “all there is” is
self-defeating. If the brain is in fact the by-product of purposeless forces
that just happened to have developed it to its present state, then developing in a markedly different way was also a possibility. What worked, according to the Darwinian
explanation, is what allowed for survival. But what makes a thing survive is not
necessarily related to what is true; I can hold many false beliefs and yet
survive over a weaker competitor whose views are actually closer to the truth. If what
we think is simply the by-product of this random process, there is no basis
upon which to place our trust. By
contrast, if we want to assert that our minds are reflecting actual truth when
they tell us that nature is all there is, then there must exist prior to, and
apart from, our perceptions, an actual true state of things that the brain is
accessing. Just as a line cannot be
considered straight or crooked until one first understands what “straight” is,
so too with the brain – it cannot assess actual truth, whether it be about
mathematical sums or about profound origin questions, unless there exists apart
from them a source of true - actual - knowledge.
The second way in which this idea fails is that it does not properly take into consideration the objective things that are out there for brains to assess. It’s one thing to “get
right” the idea that large animals are dangerous and should be avoided, or that
blunt objects can cause us harm. At some level, humans, like animals, are
possessed of instincts that help them survive. Thinking more deeply for a
moment, one quickly realizes that much more exists than animals or inanimate objects with
which we may interact. Things such as ideas
- conceptions of, for example, math, morality, and music - are real. We do not imagine them; they can be studied and tested by others. Indeed, the scientific enterprise is rooted in the notion that things are a certain way and that hypothesizing and testing will lead to useful knowledge. In short, we are aware that these ideas exist and that we can access
them, even though we also realize that they don’t actually reside in physical
things. If they did, they would be destroyed when physical things, such as
brains, cease to exist. But they live on.
Jim uses an analogy to make this point. An MP3 file is used
to store music and with the right type of device, and power running through
that device, audible music results. But the music isn't the MP3 file; the file
simply captures it for a specific type of use.
So too with our brains. The
materialist asserts that what we think is simply the product of the electrical
impulses in our brain. But the ideas, like the song stored on an MP3, exist
beyond the brain. When I contemplate
a differential equation (which I don’t do often, actually, as math is not my
strength) I realize that I am not inventing it; I realize that it pre-existed
me and that it exists apart from me. Before the first human first conceived of
it, the mathematical concepts resided somewhere and were unchanging. Indeed, it seems fair to conclude that those
ideas always existed, as it makes no sense that they came into being at a
particular point in time. Morality is
similarly perplexing for the materialist. While secular people can be moral,
the very idea that someone “ought” to act in a certain way given certain
conditions is an abstract concept that bears consideration. It is not simply
instinctual; this might make some sense in a "survival-of-the-fittest" type of way. But often times, the moral thing to do runs counter to what would
enhance our survival. The very notion of weighing and balancing the competing
interest, while searching for the “best” alternative, suggests that we all have access
to a source of “right knowledge” that we intuitively know we should apply. That pervasive feeling called “guilt” is what
results when we don’t.
Naturalism cannot
make sense this of this. To do so, the idea – whether mathematical, moral or
musical – would have to have come into existence for the first time when the
first brain first thought of it. But this is simply not the case – and we all
know it. Our brains do provide us reliable information. But they do so by facilitating the function of the mind, which has access to real and unchanging truth. The sooner we accept that notion, the sooner we can address the really pressing questions - who does ground this knowledge and why has He left us here?
23 comments:
I've seen this objection posed before, and I'm curious to see what the response might be. Essentially, it comes down to this:
The theist will say that our brains could very well be misleading us with "logic" that is actually faulty, and thus we have no reason to trust our brains unless there is a God who wired them to be trustworthy when it comes to understanding and using logic.
However, aren't we using these brains to use faulty "logic" to try and demonstrate that God exists, or at least that faith in God is reasonable? If so, then wouldn't it stand that since the "logic" is faulty, the arguments for God and faith may very well be totally off base?
I think that given the claim “God has created our brains to correspond with reality”, then – yes – theism offers a better and more satisfying explanation of why we can trust our minds. Whether or not the theist can actually justify that claim is a different question.
The claim is two-fold: that God designed our brains, and that He did so to have them correspond with “reality” or “truth”. How does one argue that God designed our brains? Intelligent Design arguments won’t work, because those don’t necessarily lead to God. An appeal to holy book obviously won’t be very persuasive. So that’s a tough argument to make.
But it’s also hard to argue that God, even if He did design brains, did so in order that they correspond rightly with reality. How do we know that God didn’t design them to pull the proverbial wool over our eyes? The only way to argue against such a notion is to point out that our brains seem to “work”, but – oops – that’s the same argument naturalists make.
Youssarian:
No, I don’t think it works in that direction. For the theist, the reliability of the mind is grounded in the notion that truth exists, that an ultimate repository and source of truth is God, and that the normally functioning human mind has access to that truth. We do not think that the mind is faulty; quite the contrary, we recognize that reason is built into the very fabric of our minds, such that people of different times and cultures can still communicate with each other and that mathematical concepts transcend time and culture.
The problem arises only when the mind goes “off course,” by positing something which is nonsensical or contradictory. Atheism is an example. If “there is no God” is objective truth, then it must mean that minds are an illusion, a product of random brain development. There can be no objective truth because there is no source of such truth. But if that is true, then the claim “there is no truth” is the very type of objective truth claim that has no grounding, and cannot be true. The thoughts become self destructive.
To be fair, it is possible that theists are wrong. But if so, the issue is not faulty logic.
JB Chappell
One argues that “God designed our brains” from inference. First, one notes that God is that supernatural being a greater than which cannot be conceived. He possesses intelligence and personality in an infinite and unlimited way. (If he did not, he would be a limited being) Next, one takes stock of what the mind does; how it naturally uses logic and reason as a built in “operating system” akin to a computer’s basic programming. How it can discover truths relating to extrinsic things – like mathematical formula, music and morality. One then asks, “what can account for such order?” Atheism and randomness have no explanatory power; I can hold to them, but only by engaging in a contradiction or by ignoring where the evidence is pointing. It would be like insisting that this computer I am using randomly assembled itself over time. I can string the words together, but they don't really make sense. Order and intelligence only come from intelligent sources. Theism, by contrast, provides the only rational conclusion to draw from an examination of the evidence.
ID arguments “don’t necessarily lead to God” only if God is defined in some other way. I do agree that an appeal to the holy book is not persuasive to one who does not believe; it does not contradict reason but explains things that reason, alone, cannot reach.
That God designed our brains to correspond with reality is self-evident. It is embedded within reason. Science stands in testimony to it. It was the order of nature and the repeatability of events that allowed Western science to begin in the first place. Yes, God may be deceiving us. Indeed, I may be a “brain in a vat” that is imagining all of this – including this interaction with you.
But neither one of us really believes that…. Otherwise, you would not have bothered to write.
AI, thanks for the response! This is a subject of great interest to me. I'm a big fan of C.S. Lewis, and especially how he developed the Argument from Reason (which this is obviously derivative of). Nevertheless, while I think the argument is sufficient to give strict naturalism-determinism pause, I'm not certain it is very persuasive towards theism.
Ignoring for the moment the subjectivity of the “greatest conceivable Being” definition, if you’re going to argue from inference that “God created brains”, this does not require that God be unlimited. Furthermore, you simplify the two competing explanations into atheism vs. theism, but it does not follow from theism in general that brains were designed by God. Only a specific form of theism would argue that (which you seem to concede). So, just because you feel that atheism does not provide rational account of the mind does not mean you have warrant for believing “God designed brains”. This isn't a strict dichotomy of choices.
I would agree that intelligence begets intelligence is a strong inductive claim, but I wonder how we can extrapolate this to God. We could easily say that our brains were simply designed by a more powerful life form, not necessarily God. Of course, this is unsatisfying because it begs the question (not in a logically fallacious way) of where the aliens’ intelligence comes from, but it is nevertheless a legitimate answer. Unsatisfying does not = wrong. One could also argue that ultimately God would have to be responsible for intelligence, because we cannot posit aliens ad infinitum, but nevertheless the facts remain that there are competing explanations between “God designed brains” and naturalism and "God is ultimately responsible for intelligence does not necessarily equate to "God designed brains". Perhaps we could say that “God” would be a simpler solution here (via Occam’s Razor) but that doesn’t necessarily make it the “best” explanation until we compare explanatory scope, power, etc.
For the sake of argument, though, let's assume that God is the better solution to aliens. (Which, to be honest, I tend to agree with, even though I am not certain I could demonstrate it at the moment). That God designed brains to correspond with reality is clearly NOT self-evident, since there are so many that disagree with it. Claiming “self-evidence” here does the theist no favors, because if that is a legitimate move, then why can’t the atheist merely claim (as I’m sure many would) that it is “self-evident” that the brain has evolved to correspond with reality? And again, it won’t do to claim that we know it corresponds with reality because it seems to “work”, because that is an equally valid explanation for atheism/naturalism as well.
No, to claim that God designed our brains a certain way is to make certain assumptions about God’s nature that cannot be justified. We have to assume He would want to engineer in a similar that we would want to, or that His motives are pure in the same way we understand good motives, but this is clearly constructing God in our own image. We don’t actually know these things. Unless I’m missing something, of course… ;)
And of course, no, I don’t believe we are “vat brains”. But the fact that I don’t believe this can obviously be explained by something other than it not being true.
JB:
Thanks for weighing in.
I think we agree on many points. I too find “intelligence begets intelligence” as a strong inductive claim. And I agree that the possibility exists that man was actually designed and created by an advanced alien race. Strictly speaking, even if God created those aliens, they would – in that scenario – be the ones who actually designed human brains.
I didn’t engage this argument for two reasons: I need to keep these blog posts short and I don’t think there is any good reason to believe in the “aliens” explanation, just as I don’t think there are good reasons to believe the “brain in a vat” explanation.
Additionally, I was using “brains” as a short hand way of referring to “intelligence” or “reason” or “logic.” These attributes of the mind are not really part of the brain anyway, but they obviously interact with the brain, such that damage or trauma to the brain can affect the functioning of these “programs.” So, the simple point I was trying to make is that the best inference to draw from the existence of brains that manifest “intelligence” is that an intelligence is the original cause. Consequently, it really wouldn’t matter whether this ultimate intelligence directly created human brains, or did so through some lesser creature.
Your next point is harder for me to grasp. Using “self evident” as an argument has negatives, and you are right that anyone can say it about anything. But, there are certain things that must simply be accepted, as they could never be “proved.” Reason and logic are two examples; we would need to use both in order to prove their reliability, which obviously would get us nowhere. If I accept that my mind accurately assesses reality (which we both seem to agree on) then I must ask the further question: “how could this be so?” If I answer, “it is self evident that it evolved that way,” then I run into the problem I mentioned in the post: I have no good basis to trust as true what a random, purposeless process produces. The better answer, the one we both intuitively seem to recognize, is that our minds are accessing something real, something outside of us, and something unchangeable. Claiming that either view “works” seems to miss the point; one view “makes sense” while the other suffers from internal incoherence. Both views might allow us to “do science,” but only one can explain why we should have confidence that general rules exist for us to identify and study.
Your next point brings things into proper focus: yes, we make assumptions about God. I drew from Anselm’s famous formulation of what the attributes of God must be. These too (I believe) are self-evident, as the conception “God” has meaning in my mind. It is not simply a word or label – as in “blue” or “heavy” – but a conception, such as the conception that “food” is anything that can be eaten and provides nourishment. If “God” means anything, it means “that being a greater than which cannot be conceived.” I cannot prove this in a laboratory, because conceptions are not subject to such testing. I must trust that your mind works the same way that mine does, and that you too can see that the conception “God” means precisely that. I think therefore that this does “justify” my assumptions about God. Certainly, such a being could never be examined in a lab anyway, so our alternative would be to conclude that we can know nothing about him. But there are many things – like my feelings or my sense of ethics – that I can properly “know” without being able to subject them to scientific experimentation.
Perhaps you can expand a bit on your last comment – the one regarding engineering and purity of motives. I’m not sure I’m following you yet. It reminds me a bit of Augustine’s efforts to show what “good” is and how “evil” is a departure from or privation of the good. I think that we can reach a general understanding about God from this method.
Al, thanks again for the many points of discussion. I do understand the need for brevity in posts, and that not all potential objections can be addressed - otherwise these would be dissertations, not blog posts.
I'm not sure if not believing there are good reasons for thinking aliens exist is a good reason to dismiss this possibility, seeing as how one could use the phenomenon of brains/itelligence to argue for their existence. If "God" and "aliens" explain the same set of facts here (the existence of human brains), then ostensibly they have the same explanatory scope, yes? "God" would have more explanatory power... but "God" ALWAYS has more explanatory power. So, that seems to be an unfair comparison. God is the simpler explanation, so for now I'm content with that as deciding which explanation is "best".
Regarding "self-evidence": if you want to claim that it is self-evident that our mental faculties reliably access an external reality, because otherwise we have to use our own mental faculties to justify this, then fine. But that isn't what you claimed. You claimed that it is self-evident that God designed our brains to be reliable. The former claim would work for either the theist or the atheist. The latter obviously not so much for the atheist. So, if you want to argue by inference that God designed our brains, great, but that isn't self evident. And obviously the atheist would also argue by inference that God did not, and we could evaluate the arguments accordingly, but this would have nothing to do with whether or not our minds are reliable. Both sides can claim that the mind being reliable is self-evident, and so both would be on equal footing using this line of (non-)reasoning. But we don't want to be on equal footing, so we try to reference an external source for reliability. That way that we can evaluate the relative strengths of explanations/grounding, which is ultimately "God" vs. "nature".
C.S. Lewis (and others) would claim that it is incoherent or illogical for a non-rational process (evolution) to produce a rational process. I would claim that this seems like an over-emphasis on semantics, because otherwise it would also be "incoherent" for IN-organic processes to produce organic processes. We accept that "emergence" occurs in nature, so it really is more of an issue as to whether or not intelligence can be an example, or if there is any warrant for believing it is an example. But I would note that once we accept non-rational processes accounting for rational processes as at least *possible*, then the self-evident reliability of our minds takes over. If the process (evolution) is seen as probable/plausible, the result (intelligence) as self-evident, and the bridge is at least possible, then there is no real objection that can be made, except that theism is MORE probable/plausible...
...So it would seem to be a better claim, as Plantinga puts it, that evolution does not necessarily emphasize truth value as much as it does survival and reproduction. So it would seem that theism can provide a more plausible account for the reliability of our minds, because - ostensibly - design can better account for truth values than a "random" process.
The problem, as I see it, with this thinking (and let it be known that I have no idea if Plantinga would have put it that way, I was just referencing his Evolutionary Argument Against Naturalism initially, the remainder is my own speculation) is that design can equally account for non-truth values. As you seem to concede, it is only when we make additional *assumptions* about God that we can plausibly account for the design of the brain being reliable. But if we're having to make ad hoc assumptions, it's hard to justify that one's explanation is in any way better.
So, rather than simply assume God is "good", which would be obviously ad hoc, the classical theist makes an interesting move. They define God as the "greatest conceivable Being" (GCB), which would seem to *entail* goodness. Thus, no ad hoc - God's goodness flows out of how He is defined (this works with "Perfect Being" or "having every perfection" as well). Heck, if you hold to the Ontological Argument, His very existence flows out of how we define Him.
But this is the very problem (to me). That we can conceive of a being in such a way, hardly entails that such a Being exists. Thus, it would be better to say IF God is "Good", then He plausibly accounts for why our minds are reliable. But that is a conditional statement, hardly a convincing explanation. The bottom line is that concepts such as "perfection" and "great" are subjective, and if God exists, He hardly is dependent on how we conceive of Him. Thus, resorting to GCB-type theology to justify anything is problematic in my mind.
As for my comment on engineering and pure motives... I was simply pointing out that except blatantly assuming ad hoc that God is "good" or utilizing GCB theology, the only other way (I see) to justify why God making our brains reliable is to construct God in our own image, which is obviously problematic in its own right.
JB
I think your point regarding brains is well taken. As I said in my last response, by “brains” I was actually referring to intelligence, so my point remains: even if aliens designed the human brain, they didn’t design the intelligence that emerges from the interaction of the brain and mind. I think that distinction supports my response to your next point about what is self evident. Again, my assertion is that the reliability of intelligence is self-evident, in the very basic sense that if I don’t start with that premise, I can’t very well use intelligence – the only tool I have available – to “prove” that intelligence is reliable. This is where the atheist position falls off; they can claim the mind to be reliable, but they cannot ground such a claim, for the reasons discussed in the post.
As for your next argument, I do not accept the proposition that organic emerged from inorganic (assuming I understand your terms correctly). Life from non-life is – self-evidently – a product of intelligence and power; no other explanation has been shown, nor does a naturalistic explanation make sense, unless one wishes to secretly import intelligence and power into the “emergence” property of nature. Even the simplest life form is operating complex DNA coding which, due to its specificity and complexity, require an intelligence source as a necessary cause.
I’m not sure what you mean when you say “design can equally account for non-truth values.” Perhaps you can expand on that notion.
As for your ontological argument comment, the response that Anselm was “defining” God in a circular way misses the point of the argument. On the surface, it may seem that Anselm ended up with the attribute embedded in the definition. However, Anselm was not defining God, but allowing his mind to fully consider the “conception” at play when “God” is being considered. Earlier I used food as an example: if I define “food” as “containers made of porcelain,” I would be justified in calling an ash tray “food.” Doing so would be an example of labeling or naming something in a circular fashion. However, the label is not the issue. Try digesting an ash tray and the label will make no difference. This is because the “conception” food defies any particular label but applies generally to any “thing” that is edible and provides nourishment. This seems like a “definition” but it really is much more than that – it is the process of expressing in words what the conception means. Through such explanations, we make sense of the world, using intelligence – the only tool we have at our disposal to perform such tasks.
It is from this conception of ultimate perfection that the inference can be drawn that God is “good.” Consequently, I do not believe that I am “assuming” this conclusion.
Best,
Al
Al, it seems to me that that the theist grounds the reliability of intelligence in the same way the atheist/naturalist does: in a process that may or may not achieve the desired results (reliability of our minds), unless we bring added assumptions to table. The atheist grounds it in "evolution", which (however you want to define it) is a decidedly non-rational, non-truth-valuing process. I responded to this by stating that just because we add a negative prefix to a term, does not mean that one cannot lead to another. It seems I was unclear with what I meant by that, so let me elaborate a bit.
I'm not sure what your views are on cosmology, whether you accept a standard "Big Bang" beginning for the universe or not. If you do not, I guess I can see why you would balk at my example. If you do, then it isn't really debatable that "IN"-organic chemistry gave rise to organic chemistry. There were no carbon atoms at the Big Bang. They came much later, emerging from chemical "ancestors" (if you will), and then the nature of these chemical interactions changed, becoming "organic chemistry". Thus, even though we would define "inorganic" negatively (by adding an "in-" to the term), that doesn't mean that somehow it and the phenomenon its parent term ("organic" chemistry) reflects are somehow logically or physically incompatible. Hopefully, I have made it clear that what I was trying to describe has nothing to do with life from non-life. There are other examples of this kind of "emergence", so I hope we don't get too caught up on just the example.
At this point, I think the atheist/naturalist will have demonstrated that grounding rationality/intelligence in nature is at least *possible*, even if not plausible. This is where Plantinga and his Evolutionary Argument Against Naturalism, which is obviously related to the Argument from Reason, comes in with its (proper) accusation that evolution isn't necessarily a truth-valuing process; it's a survival-value process. Therefore, "evolution" shouldn't be considered as plausible as theism.
The theist grounds intelligence in other intelligence, and design. I described the problem with this as being that "design" isn't necessarily a truth-valuing process either. This is what I meant by “design can equally account for non-truth values.” In other words, design can just easily be used to pull the wool over someone's eyes - and obviously has been used for such purposes. I would add that design processes can also be flawed. Thus, both the theist and atheist at this point are trying to ground the reliability of intelligence in processes that do not *necessarily* produce what we're trying to ground.
Here's where (certain) theists would play the trump "God" card. It cannot be denied that design, as a process, can be used for ill. It cannot be denied that it can produce errant results. But that's not the case if the Being utilizing the process is all-good, all-knowing, and all-powerful. I am not satisfied with such an arrangement, however, for many reasons.
My problem with ontological arguments is not that they are circular. My problem with ontological arguments is that we cannot define things into existence, and that "concepts" are obviously subjective (so if "God" is the GCB, then "God" is different for everyone). Further, moving past the arguments to the properties that we assign based on this definition obviously conflict and become incoherent. But let's ignore all this for the moment. I don't want to get too sidetracked into classical theism (although I admit I played a part!)....
...Let's focus on God's "goodness", because - for the sake of our discussion - I think that is the property that matters. [I'm willing to grant that even if God isn't all-knowing or all-powerful, that God almost assuredly a lot smarter and more powerful than we would be, which - in practice - is indistinguishable from omnipotence/omniscience]. The classical theist would claim that a "great" being would have to be "good". Presumably, the GCB would have the greatest amount of "good". Somehow, this becomes "unlimited good" or "all-good". That's an unmerited leap, I would say. In any case, I cannot conceive of what "all-good" or "unlimited good" would be, which highlights the subjectivity of this line of thinking.
Regardless, the classical theist (any theist, really) runs into a little problem called The Problem of Evil. Now, I have no interest in defending the argument in the sense that it supposedly proves God isn't all-good. The point is that any theodicy developed in response to this problem basically uses the thinking "God's ways are not necessarily our ways", "God can have good reasons for allowing evil", etc. The point is, that what we consider "evil", God can use for "good". So, it becomes a problem, then, for the theist to try to claim that a "good" God wouldn't develop a mind that deceives us. How do we know that God cannot have his reasons for doing so? We don't.
Alas, we resort to anthromorphic thinking instead. We conceive of God being "good" in the way *we think that looks like*. We conceive of God engineering in the same way we would. And we do this while simultaneously admitting that often He does not, and we just have to trust that He has His ("good") reasons. Thus, God's goodness cannot - in my mind - be used to support the notion that He would build a trustworthy mind. Certainly, God would have the capability - but no one has any idea if He has the motive.
I’ll answer some of your questions first: my views on cosmology appear similar to yours. I hold to the standard “big bang” theory and I accept the idea that organic chemicals emerged from inorganic ones. These are the building blocks from which life eventually emerged. What I was trying to make clear was that, for life to emerge, intelligence and power were required. I reject the naturalistic hypothesis that random mutations over time could account for these changes.
I agree that the presence of design does not connote goodness. Design can also be used to deceive a person. But it can only do that with reference to objective truth. If all things are relative and subjective, then the deceiver is not actually deceiving; his narrative is simply different, and coincidentally beneficial to him. God is that ultimate good. Whether we choose to accept him or not, he defines the line so that we know what straight is; in the same way, his nature is good, such that what we perceive as evil is a departure from that good. Otherwise, you’re left with a situation in which God is compared to “true” goodness to see how he measures up. But in that scenario, you are no longer conceiving of a maximally great being, but one which is subordinate to a “higher standard.” The source of that higher standard would therefore be God – or at least closer to God than the being under consideration.
I agree that we are getting sidetracked, but one response as to the ontological argument is necessary – concepts are not subjective. They may be subject to disagreement, but they are not personal preferences, like chocolate is the best flavor. Going back to my food analogy, a person who insists that an ash tray is food would be acting subjectively, but in reference to the true state of things, would be getting his conception wrong. Conceptions, then, are things we discover about the world around us, not labels we place on things we observe.
You say that it is an unmerited leap to say that the greatest conceivable being possesses the attributes of being “all good” or possessing “unlimited good.” I agree with your next point – that we cannot really conceive of what “unlimited” or “all” fully convey. However, I believe such a conclusion flows from the logic underlying the conception. If you are comparing “god” to a greater standard, or if you are holding on to the notion that “god” may somehow fall short of possessing good that is “unlimited” or total, then you are thinking of a lesser being. Something is causing the limitation to his capacity for good -either some other being or some inherent weakness or lack within him. This being you are thinking of may or may not exist, but you are not yet thinking of God. In other words, if our minds’ ability to discover conceptions has any value – Anselm framed it as an assertion, that our minds are only capable of conceiving of real things – then considering God means considering the maximally good being. Otherwise, this exercise in trying to form conceptions should be abandoned as unreliable. But consider, to abandon it as unreliable (which I believe you are suggesting since you think we may be tricked by this being) is itself evidence of the underlying program that the mind is operating, as it seeks to find truth. (here, that truth cannot be reliably found, which itself would be a truth claim that one wishes to rely upon, thereby contradicting itself).
Your next paragraph, regarding the problem of evil, is not clear to me. God did not create “evil” and while he may use evil for some ultimate good, he does not bear responsibility for it. The reason flows from the classical (Augustinian) view of evil – it is the manifestation of the actions of free-will beings who are in rebellion against the source of all good – i.e. God. God is responsible for creating free will beings. Had he created us to be perfectly functioning robots, there would be no problem of evil, but then there wouldn’t be true relationship with him either. We would be real, alive and functioning, but we would not be personal beings.
Your last paragraph makes more sense to me. I agree with you that we often subjectively attribute to God characteristics that we happen to like. For example, God would be a good conservative, or God supports the United States. When we do so, we risk getting it wrong. What underlies most of these notions is a sense of what we want most – to live “forever” in health, wealth and comfort, surrounded by loved ones. We were actually meant for that – and someday we will have it again – but this world is not that place. We both agree that this is the case. My worldview has much explanatory power in making sense of this – the Fall caused a break from God and we are now being punished. Death is actually the solution, for without death we would be eternally separated from him in bodies which are continuing to run down and decay. This provides little comfort when tragedy strikes, but such feelings do not make the worldview untrue.
In the end, I think your conclusions flow from that unstated assumption – that life here is supposed to be better than it actually is. You then look for the cause of the problem, and assume that the God who left us here may be playing a cruel trick on us. Christianity, by contrast, is grounded in the notion that God is not the problem, we are. We use our minds to discover this truth, and the truth of Christ’s sacrifice for us, and we assent to the repairs that God wants to effect upon us. God’s motives are good, and so are his actions. But it remains up to us to bend our will to his… and not try to accomplish the opposite.
Al, you say:
If the brain is in fact the by-product of purposeless forces that just happened to have developed it to its present state, then developing in a markedly different way was also a possibility. What worked, according to the Darwinian explanation, is what allowed for survival. But what makes a thing survive is not necessarily related to what is true; I can hold many false beliefs and yet survive over a weaker competitor whose views are actually closer to the truth. If what we think is simply the by-product of this random process, there is no basis upon which to place our trust.
An admirable summary of Plantinga's EAAN position. The trouble is, not just any false belief can improve survival chances over a more or less true belief: it must be a false belief that leads to more appropriate action than a true belief would. While there are undoubtedly examples of such false beliefs, our picture of the world is not made up of individual random beliefs out of the blue, but of a more or less coherent story of how the world works, and there aren't many false stories that can compete in usefulness and coherence over the truth.
In other words: one would expect, on a naturalistic worldview, that a successful worldview is likely to evolve to an ever closer approximation or model of the truth, not just entertain random fantasies that have no coherence, such as Plantinga's risible example of a caveman successfully evading tigers because he wants to pet them, and thinks the best way to pet them is to run away from them.
Zilch,
I think your comment sneaks in an objective standard - actual truth. On the naturalistic worldview, I'm free to reject an objective standard. "Truth" has no grounding, so even if I think that the caveman evolved because he got it "closer to the truth," the thought itself is meaningless - unless I first assume that an objective truth standard pre-existed nature and somehow stands apart from and above it. But if I assume that, my naturalistism takes a hit as a viable worldview.
Al,
Let me grant for the moment that concepts are not subjective, because we at least agree that they are "subject to disagreement". With your ash tray analogy, I could easily disagree with your insistence on that not being "food", because there are many people who can digest differently than we can. I don't want to attack your analogy only, but it should be clear that concepts that exist in the mind only are subjective.
If you claim that God as the GCB is not a "subjective" concept, but something "we discover", then - unless I'm sorely misunderstanding you - you're claiming to have "discovered" the concept of the GCB and labeled it "God". This is opposed to defining "God" as the GCB. The conversation seems to hinge on this, to me, because I am aware of no such discovery. It has always been my understanding the the GCB is a way to define "God". If you could elaborate on how Anselm (or whoever) discovered the GCB, I would greatly appreciate it.
Now, as to whether the GCB necessitates "all-goodness", or omnibenevolence... you agree that we cannot conceive of what omnibenevolence is. It seems to me a fairly easy conclusion, then, that it isn't really a "concept". If we can't conceive of what it is, then it's hard to justify it's inclusion as part of a GCB. Either it is conceivable or it isn't.
Al,
Now, regarding the Problem of Evil... We agree that God can use "Evil" (or whatever we would consider/perceive as such), and use it for Good. For my point, it really doesn't matter if God created evil or not. What matters is that we have epistemic shortcomings. We don't really know why God does some things and/or allow others.
Every theist I know grants this. Therefore, there is no reason to assume an anthromorphic notion of God's design process. Just because we would think that a "good" God would design our minds to reliably construct "concepts" does not mean that He would, in fact, do so.
It is ironic to me that so many (classical) theists would so readily (and correctly) correct someone using the "But a 'good' God wouldn't..." line of reasoning, and yet implicitly do the opposite in attempting to "ground" rationality: "A 'good' God would create reliable minds."
"It has always been my understanding the the GCB is a way to define "God"."
To define a word is to explain it using other words. In that sense, explaining the term “God” with the GCB understanding is a definition. That is why so many people see the ontological argument as circular. If I define arsenic as a type of powerful medicine, and then conclude it is medicine, I am reasoning circularly. Bur arsenic’s “definition” is not what concerns me. What concerns me is its actual effect on the body. It is only “medicine” or “poison” in relation to the body that it enters, and what I call it as no effect on that. So, if I’m rational, I’ll find out what effect it has and then label it accordingly. I will move from understanding – conception – to labeling; I will not define it first, regardless of what it is, and then insist it is the thing I called it, regardless of what effect it actually has.
Contemplating the GCB is a way of making sense conceptually of God’s attributes. How Anselm made this discovery is something I too would like to know. Perhaps he conveys it in his writings, but I cannot tell you. My suspicion is he spent a lot of time thinking about it, and wasn’t distracted by TV and other modern conveniences.
We cannot fully comprehend omnibenevolence. I cannot fully comprehend the workings of this computer. Both are and remain conceptions, however, even if I can’t fully capture what those conceptions entail.
Regarding the Problem of Evil
It does make a difference if God created evil. This would make him evil, a contradiction. Augustine’s view eliminates this potential problem – evil is the word we use to describe our falling short of God’s perfect will. He did not create it; he created beings endowed with free will. When we use that free will in ways contrary to God’s nature, we do “evil.”
It is true that we cannot understand fully what God’s will is. But we can make sense of concepts such as “good” and “deceit.” As I’ve mentioned in other posts, deceit is the act of an intelligent being who seeks to gain something that he desires but does not possess. This isn’t an anthropomorphism. It simply stands to reason. A perfect and infinite being lacks nothing and has no needs. His act of creation is an act of selfless (agape) love. He gains nothing by deceiving us, because he has no need of gain; he has no need of anything.
Yes, I could be completely wrong about this. I may be a brain in a vat that is being misled into thinking that I am a living person. I may be misled into thinking God is good. But logic and reflection leave me no good reason to think this is the case, and so I reject it.
Al,
If we agree that we cannot why God does certain things, then what remains to be seen is whether we understand why God would/wouldn’t create reliable minds. With respect to this, you claim to “know” that the deceit is “the act of an intelligent being who seeks to gain something that he desires but does not possess”. Because God lacks nothing, it stands to reason that He would not deceive. Thus, plausible grounds for God creating reliable minds.
A few problems come to (my) mind. First, your definition is loaded. You are granting that we cannot (fully) understand why God would do certain things, yet you define “deceit” as necessitating intent to gain. This is inconsistent in my mind. Beyond this inconsistency, it also steps beyond what is the standard definition of “deceit”. Deceit does not have to entail an intent to gain something that is lacking. Finally, if it is the case that we consider deceit something that requires an intent to gain based on observation of intelligent agents (inductive reasoning), then presumably we would apply the same reasoning with creation. Intelligent agents create things out of a desire to gain something they lack.
If that is the case, however, then we’d have to conclude that God, if He did create the universe, is not a Being that lacks nothing. Of course, this would be a startling and perhaps disturbing concession, so I would say it is better to just concede that we do not know why God acts the way He does, or creates the way He does. The side-effect from this, however, is that we cannot claim some sort of high ground with regard to grounding the reliability of the mind.
Al,
"How Anselm made this discovery is something I too would like to know."
No offense, but I think we’re at the point where either you or Anselm would have to “show your work”, so to speak. You are admitting that you don’t know how Anselm made this discovery, and I appreciate that honesty! But it seems to me that absent that information, no good argument can be made. To be honest, I have not read Anselm’s work – but I highly doubt that he details this “discovery”. Because I don’t think it is one. It’s simply what HE thought of when He thought of God, so he defined it that way. Oh, and added bonus: if you assume your “concepts” must be real and that only a “fool” would disagree, then your position becomes unassailable.
Otherwise, the argument relies on a spurious assumption (we can only conceive real things) which in turn relies on an equivocation (how is “conceive” any different than “imagine” or "define"?). I think you are correct that he spent a lot of time thinking about, as you put it to Zilch: “what is it the mind conceives of when it thinks about God”? No question. I’m certainly not doubting either his philosophical acumen or his dedication. However, if you substitute “the” with “my” the problem becomes clear: it is a subjective argument. It only seems objective when we assume that we couldn’t possibly be imagining things.
The dismissiveness that arises out of this way of thinking disturbs me. Anselm would consider those who don’t agree with the GCB “concept” as fools. You would say, more charitably, that we need to think about it more. Because, you know, the problem can’t possibly be with the concept, because that’s “real” Why is it real? Because we assume so. Yikes.
If God exists, I would say He’d have to be the greatest Being that Exists (GBTE). Can you explain why that “concept” is inferior to the GCB in a way that doesn’t reduce to it simply not leading to where you/Anselm would want it to go, or “you haven’t thought about it hard enough, otherwise you’d agree?”
Intelligent beings create to obtain something they lack. Infinite beings lack nothing, so this could not be an adequate motivation. Therefore, infinite beings create for other reasons. The Christian worldview holds that God created out of sheer love – the desire that we share eternity with him, even though we provide him nothing in return. This is pure agape love, which is foreign to most human thinking.
I see you disagree with me regarding deceit. Perhaps you should provide a working definition. Plants and animals do not engage in deceit, because they lack intelligence. When humans do so, they do so for a reason. The reason may be ill-conceived; it may even be imaginary or unnecessary, but deceit implies purpose. If the lie is simply a mistake, it is not deceit. Now, you can draw what you want from this, but it makes no sense to me that an unlimited and perfect being would seek to gain something when he has no need to do so. Acting deceitfully is irrational when there is no reason or purpose in doing so, and perfectly rational beings don’t engage in irrational acts.
Anselm does show his work. There are a number of good books and translations. I couldn’t do justice to them even if I wanted to. What I was referring to was that I wish I knew how his mind starting down the path that led to this formulation.
I actually wrote a post about why Anselm would consider those who disagreed with him foolish. You can find it here:
http://pleaseconvinceme.blogspot.com/2010/09/what-fool-believes.html
The reason would not be arrogance on Anselm’s part. Instead, I think he would claim that the atheist is stating a contradiction, which if done intentionally certainly qualifies as foolish.
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