Is Atheism Foolish?

“The fool has said in his heart, “There is no God.” If this passage from Psalms is correct, then many people today - including numerous scientists and other well-educated folks - are fools, for they insist that God does not exist. While name-calling is never productive, is there a way in which one might conclude that such a person is indeed a "fool," and not  merely someone with whom we disagree?

Well, let’s begin with a look at the definition of “fool,” which includes “a person who has been tricked or deceived into appearing or acting silly or stupid.” Now, sometimes we trick ourselves, and thereby make fools of ourselves. And other times we are misled. But either way, most would agree that someone who holds contradictory views has deceived himself. Imagine a person proudly proclaiming that the prime rib he is about to eat is an important part of his vegetarian diet. Or the person who says that the only medicine that can save him is the one with no ingredients.

But sometimes contradictions aren't as obvious. Why, then, is it a contradiction to insist there is no God? It doesn't appear to be contradictory - at first glance anyway. For the answer to that question, we are indebted to St. Anselm of Canterbury, who lived and pondered these questions some ten centuries ago. I can’t do justice to Anselm’s argument in this brief piece, but perhaps some concepts borrowed from Anselm may help make the point.

The first requires consideration of just what the mind does. Anyone who has seen a baby develop realizes that the human mind comes pre-programmed with an “operating system” of sorts. This allows us to acquire language, to reason, to recognize concepts such as fairness and truth and beauty, and other intangible things, and to make use of imagination. This ability for abstract thought lends itself to “got it” moments, when a problem that has been puzzling us all of a sudden makes sense. We all use these systems naturally and  intuitively; of course there is no other way, since we could never use reason, for instance, to prove the validity or usefulness of reason.

One aspect of this ability for abstract thought is the ability to conceptualize. Food, for instance, can encompass a million different things, but to qualify it must be edible and serve to nourish, and not poison, us. We can call an ash tray food, but the underlying thing is not a matter of what we call it, but of what it consists.

So, with this observation in view, consider for a moment not what a definition of God might be, but what the conception of God is. What is it that we are struggling to grasp when we use that term? Anselm’s definition was simply this – God is that being a greater than which cannot be conceived. Whatever attributes God would have – omnipotence, omnipresence, perfect goodness, etc. – if you can conceive of a being with all those attributes plus an additional one, then the latter would be God. So, imagine two beings then – each with exhaustive, infinite powers. One of the two has the attribute of necessary existence, while the other may or may not exist. Clearly, the former – the one with necessary existence – would be the greater. Consequently, to fully conceive of God, we must be conceiving of a Being who can’t not exist, whose existence must always have been and will always continue to be. Anything else simply cannot fit the conception of God.

So, what does that prove? Maybe this conception of God is imaginary. Not so, Anselm would contend. And here’s why: the mind is not capable of conceptualizing something that does not in fact exist, that does not relate to something real. Now, this premise is a bit harder to get one’s mind around. The normal response to this part of the argument is that we create imaginary things all the time, from unicorns to tooth fairies to Jedi Knights. But each of these things, while imaginary, is the combining of things that are real: a horse and a horn; a person with wings and unusual powers; a warrior with special abilities and unusual weapons. And, moreover, neither a unicorn nor a tooth fairy nor a Jedi Knight would possess the attribute of necessary existence. If a unicorn did exist, it would have to consist of a horse with a single horn in its head; but its existence could have occurred briefly in the distant past, or could arise in the distant future or could not occur at all. We can fully conceptualize such a creature without the need that the creature itself actually exist, because the conceptualization does not require necessary existence. For God, by contrast, the only way to conceptualize Him is as a necessarily existent being. If you are not seeing Him that way, says Anselm, you are not yet thinking about God, but about something lesser.

This foray into philosophy can be difficult. Fortunately, there are many other proofs for God’s existence, ones much easier with which to grapple, but this one stands out for its elegance. For if it has merit, then God has embedded within us the means to find Him in the one place we have exclusive and special access to: our very minds.

If Anselm is right, then the fool who denies God is saying something like “I believe that the Being who must necessarily exist does not exist.” A rather foolish thing to say, when you see it clearly.

The Bible says that God has written his law on our heart. Perhaps if we probe a bit deeper still, we can also begin to see in its depths the first faint scratching of His signature.

Is Atheism Foolish?

Can Logic and Reason Prove God is Good?

My last two posts considered what things we can conclude about God from logic and reason. Drawing on the work of 11^th century philosopher St. Anselm of Canterbury, I took the position that we can rightly place our trust in God because his nature encompasses infinite goodness.

This resulted in some dialogue regarding a perceived flaw in Anselm’s approach. Anselm’s view of God was, in short, that if He does exist, he must necessarily be “that being a greater than which cannot be conceived (or GCB, as a shorthand reference to the Greatest Conceivable Being).  From this conception, one comes to realize that a starting point for beginning to make sense of the notion of “God” is to constantly test whether the being in your present understanding is indeed greater than all other possible beings. This led Anselm to compare a being with contingent existence – a God who might possibly exist – to a being which must necessarily exist. Of course, the latter must be God, as such a being is greater than a contingent or possibly non-existent being. All of this made sense to Anselm because he assumed that the mind can only conceive of “real” things.

Here was the challenger’s position:

Regarding Anselm’s assumption that the mind can only conceive of “real” things. Why believe this is true? I can “conceive” of unicorns, griffons, orcs, etc. But they do not exist. Given this, we must either claim that either mythical creatures are “real” in some sense, or that I am “imagining”, rather than “conceiving”. The question, then, would be how we would know Anselm wasn’t “imagining” the GCB.

What Anselm meant by “real” was roughly “conforming to reality.”  He did not mean that there were no such things as imagination or imaginary things, living or not. Consequently, for the examples provided, Anselm would have no difficulty with a unicorn, as a horse with a horn, a grifon, a winged animal with certain powers, or an orc, a humanoid type being. Whether actually currently existing, or imaginary, these things consist of real things – bodies, horns, wings, etc. – assembled in new, different or imaginary ways.

There is an important next step however. Let’s consider the unicorn. Perhaps it once existed, perhaps it exists somewhere in the world or in the universe, or perhaps it will someday come into existence. These possibilities appear when I begin to conceive of a “unicorn.” I can recognize it as imaginary, also. But what is clear to me is that such a being does not have, as one of its attributes, the quality of “necessary existence.” There is nothing about a unicorn that requires me to understand that, if there were such a life form, it must necessarily exist. I realize that at most it is a contingent being, a being which may exist only in the imagination.  To this, the typical challenger to Anselm would say, “well, I am imagining a unicorn that does necessarily exist, some sort of “god-unicorn.” But this gets us nowhere. Again, imagination is simply that; in this case, it involves the imaginer combining two things that don’t go together, roughly similar to the imaginer saying that he is thinking of a square circle. Mere words, with no corresponding reality. One can think of a unicorn, and one can think of a limitless being that has necessary existence, but one realizes that the two are not the same.

 To conceive of God, by contrast, necessarily requires that we view God as eternal, always existing, and never possibly ceasing to exist. That is the essence of God-ness. Anselm was not imagining the GCB. He was, by contrast, allowing the inborn processes of his mind to inform him as to what followed logically from the conception. His contribution, I believe, was in realizing where logic and reason inexorably led: perhaps there isn’t a God, he began, but if there is one, he would have to be…. Included in this list was necessary and eternal/everlasting existence. But if this is true, Anselm intuited, then the mere recognition of the possibility of God’s existence – which most everyone will acknowledge – leads logically to the necessary conclusion that he must therefore exist.

The challenger's next point:

Also, “logic and reason” do not tell us that God must be unlimited. In fact, being unlimited would automatically place God outside the domain of logic and reason. When considering we have no actual “concept” of an unlimited being, it would seem that an unlimited being *cannot* be the GCB. We can only “conceive” of things that our minds can comprehend. To comprehend, we use logic and reason. A God that can be comprehended by logic and reason would obviously be limited by these rational constraints. Thus, this Being would be limited.

This argument is based on an assertion that if God could be comprehended by logic and reason, this would create a limitation upon him. The conclusion is based, I believe, on two mistaken assumptions: the first is that the writer seems to think I mean to say that we, as humans, can fully comprehend God. I do not think that this is the case. By analogy, I can know things about nuclear power that are accurate without being able to fully comprehend nuclear power. The second is that logic and reason somehow stand outside of God, boxing in his options. Logic and reason are manifestations of his nature, not limitations upon it. God does not submit himself to logic and reason; they emanate from his nature. Consequently, recognizing that God’s nature is logical and reasonable are descriptions of God; they do not limit him.

Finally:

Finally, it would seem that if you are to “ground” the reliability of the mind in an Anselm-ian notion of God’s goodness, then you are arguing circularly. After all, if Anselm *assumed* that we can only conceive of real things, then moved on to “prove” God’s goodness, then the very thing you are trying to ground was assumed in the argument.

This last point is interesting. If I understand it correctly, the assertion is that first, I am assuming that the mind is grounded in a good God, and then I conclude using that mind that God must be good. I think this is a fair point.  The problem is that it is like one saying, “you claim that logic and reason are good tools for arriving at truth; now prove it.” But I would have to use logic and reason to “prove” anything, so this too would be considered circular. No, I would say, by contrast, that these are starting points. I must intuitively recognize that logic and reason are programs that my mind came “pre-loaded” with and that I cannot reach behind or beyond that. Similarly here.  But what is the alternative?  If God is a great deceiver who has tricked us into thinking that “bad” is actually “good,” I could never know that this was the case.

And so, I conclude that a being possessing that much power would not create minds for the simple purpose of deceiving them into thinking that what they perceive around them is actually the opposite of what it really is. He made us personal beings because he too is personal, and he wants us to eventually find relationship with him. That’s why relationship is so important to all of us. We were built that way for a reason. But relationships built on dishonesty and deception make sense only when the one so inclined believes he can benefit from the deception. As a limitless being, God gains nothing from deceiving us. He is the source of all, and we have nothing that he wants – other than our free will freely directed toward, and not away, from him.

If reason can lead me anywhere, here  it leads me to the conclusion that such a being would act in conformance with his nature. A personal and trustworthy being, he equipped us to respond in kind.

Can Logic and Reason Prove God is Good?

Was the Early Church Communist?

In the book of Acts we are told the following about the early church in Jerusalem:

Now the whole group of those who believed were of one heart and soul, and no one claimed private ownership of any possessions, but everything they owned was held in common....There was not a needy person among them, for as many as owned lands or houses sold them and brought the proceeds of what was sold. They laid it at the apostles' feet, and it was distributed to each as any had need. (Acts 4:32-35)

So is communism the Christian ideal? Individuals who accept Marxist ideology or liberation theology may certainly argue this way and use this passage as a proof text. But is the Bible really teaching communism as a normative and ideal way of life for Christians?

Jay Richards addresses this question in his book Money, Greed, and God: Why Capitalism Is the Solution and Not the Problem.(1) He points out four important things to remember when examining this passage:

• First, this passage mentions nothing of class warfare or the idea that private property is immoral, as does modern communism. Rather, Christians were sharing freely and spontaneously.

• Second, neither does this passage mention anything about the state. The state is nowhere to be found. It is not the government that is confiscating property and collectivizing industry.

• Third, later in Acts 5 when Peter condemns Ananias and Sapphira, he does not condemn them for keeping part of the proceeds but rather for lying about the amount they received. In fact, in verse 4 Peter explicitly states the property was rightfully theirs even after they sold it: "While it remained unsold, did it not remain your own? And after it was sold, were not the proceeds at your disposal?"

• Fourth, the Bible never makes the communal life of the early church in Jerusalem prescriptive for Christians. Furthermore, it doesn't even seem to be the norm for the Jerusalem church but was rather short lived.

On this last point, Walt Russell in his book Playing with Fire: How the Bible Ignites Change in Your Soul gives us two important criteria for determining whether or not a particular behavior of Christians in the book of Acts should be considered normative and prescriptive for Christians living today (2):

• First, is the behavior repeatedly emphasized or is it a recurring theme within the broader narrative of Acts?

• Second, is this recurring pattern of behavior closely aligned with Luke's main emphasis on a universal, Law-free identity for God's people?

Examining the communal lifestyle of the early church in Jerusalem by these two criteria shows that it fails on both accounts. This behavior is nowhere mentioned again in the book of Acts or even in the entire rest of the New Testament. It also does not fit with Luke's main purpose for writing the book of Acts.

Therefore, given the context and indicators within the passage itself and the fact that this behavior is not to be considered normative or prescriptive, it certainly cannot be argued that communism is in anyway the Christian ideal or was even practiced by the early church. Marxists and liberation theologians will have to find their proof texts elsewhere.
______________________________________________

(1) See Jay W. Richards, Money, Greed, and God: Why Capitalism Is the Solution and Not the Problem (New York: HarperOne, 2009), 22-24.
(2) See Walt Russell, Playing with Fire: How the Bible Ignites Change in Your Soul (Colorado Springs: NavPress, 2000), 218-223.

Was the Early Church Communist?

Evil as Evidence FOR the Existence of God

The most common argument raised against the existence of God is the so-called problem of evil. How can an all-good, all-powerful God allow evil to exist? However, neither the atheist nor the relativist can raise the problem of evil since when you admit the existence of evil you are admitting the existence of objective moral values. The atheist cannot adequately ground objective morality and the relativist assumes that morality is relative.

In other words, the problem of evil cannot even be raised without assuming an objective standard of moral goodness. By “objective” I mean independent of what people think or perceive.[1] Complaining about evil assumes that evil is a real thing that it is objectively wrong, otherwise we could simply dismiss the atheist or relativist by saying “that’s just evil for you.”

So where does this objective standard of morality come from? The only suitable grounding for objective morality is an objective moral law-giver: God. Ironically then, the existence of evil can be turned into an argument for the existence of God:

1.      If God does not exist, objective moral values do not exist.

2.      Evil exists.

3.      Therefore, objective moral values exist.

4.      Therefore, God exists.[2]

This argument is logically valid. The skeptic concedes premise two by raising the problem of evil in the first place. Therefore, the argument hinges on premise one. However, in reflecting on premise one it seems clear that if there is no God then there is no objective grounding for moral principles which apply to all people, in all places, at all times. Morality would be relegated to cultural conventions or individual ethical subjectivism. William Lane Craig sums it up this way:

Although at a superficial level suffering calls into question God’s existence, at a deeper level suffering actually proves God’s existence. For apart from God, suffering is not really bad. If the atheist believes that suffering is bad or ought not to be, then he’s making moral judgments that are possible only if God exists.[3]

In short, when the atheist or relativist objects to the problem of evil he implicitly admits to an objective standard of morality which his own worldview cannot account for, but which makes perfect sense within the Christian worldview. In other words, in order to complain about evil and raise the objection in the first place, atheists, skeptics, and relativists must borrow from Christian moral capital and the Christian worldview.

---

[1] William Lane Craig, Reasonable Faith: Christian Truth and Apologetics, 3^rd ed. (Wheaton: Crossway, 2008), 173.

[2] William Lane Craig, Hard Questions, Real Answers (Wheaton: Crossway, 2003), 107.

[3] William Lane Craig, On Guard: Defending Your Faith with Reason and Persuasion (Colorado Springs: David Cook, 2010), 162.

Evil as Evidence FOR the Existence of God

Why Naturalism Lacks Explanatory Power Part II

            My last post examined some of the problems inherent in adopting atheistic naturalism as a model to explain how life and intelligence emerged. By contrast, I argued, the Christian worldview makes better sense of things, grounded as it is in a supernatural “perfect” being. This led to dialogue that raised to the following challenge:  even if God did design the brain, how do we know that he did so to allow the brain to rightly correspond with reality? How do we know that God did not design the brain to “pull the proverbial wool over our eyes?” The challenge concluded: the only way to argue against such a notion is to point out that our brains “seem to work,” but this is the same argument that the naturalist makes.

            In trying to respond to this challenge, I drew on the understanding of God articulated by St. Anselm of Canterbury.  In his ontological argument, Anselm explained that if one truly holds in his mind the conception of God, and all that concept conveys, then one would be thinking about “that being a greater than which cannot be conceived.” This understanding is not immediately grasped by most people. When they first hear this explanation, they believe that Anselm is simply “defining” God, as one would define a word. Or, perhaps, that Anselm is simply applying a “label” to something whose characteristics are not fixed, that are “subjective.” But this is not what Anselm was doing. He began with the premise that the mind is only capable of conceiving of things with real existence; had he lived in modern times, he may have likened it to a radio receiver than can pick up signals from “out there.” The radio must receive and decode the signals, and it uses its built-in machinery to do so. So, too, with the human mind; though we don’t understand how it is that we use logic and reason in forming conceptions, it seems to be universally true that we do. We receive ideas from outside ourselves and make sense of them using these inborn tools – logic and reason. As it relates to God, what logic and reason tell us is that this being must be unlimited and all powerful in all respects – including the quality of “goodness.”  What’s more, the point of the ontological argument is that God must have necessary existence.  God – Anselm concluded – cannot possibly not exist.

            An analogy may help clarify the point.  The conception “food” has no fixed set of items which qualify. Food necessarily means “that which can be consumed by human beings and provides nourishment.” This is more than a definition, although it can serve as one; it is a way of understanding what the speaker is referring to. I can choose to call something food, but my label must correspond to reality for it to actually be food. For example, if I define “food” to include “containers made of porcelain,” I would be justified in calling an ash tray “food.” Doing so would be an example of labeling or naming something in a circular fashion. However, the label is not the issue. Try digesting an ash tray and the label will make no difference. This is because the “conception” food defies any particular label but applies generally to any “thing” that is edible and provides nourishment. Through such explanations, we make sense of the world, using intelligence – the only tool we have at our disposal to perform such tasks.

            With these thoughts in mind, let’s return to the challenge. Why should we think that this creator God made our brains to be reliable? Why couldn’t this be some sort of cruel joke? This could be the case, I suppose, just as it could be the case that I am actually a “brain in a vat” imagining all that I believe is real. But I reject that hypothesis because I have no good reason to believe it.  

            And the reason I don’t believe it is that a God who performed acts of deception just for the fun of deceiving us could not be considered “good,” let alone as possessing infinite goodness. Think for a moment about what it means to “deceive.” Intelligent beings can do so, of course, but they can only do that with reference to objective truth. If all things are relative and subjective (as an atheistic worldview would require), then the deceiver is not actually deceiving; his narrative is simply different, and coincidentally beneficial to him. God is that ultimate good. Whether we choose to accept him or not, he defines the line so that we know what straight is; in the same way, his nature is good, such that what we perceive as evil is simply a departure from that good. 

            If one insists that God is not “good,” one is simply subordinating “god” to some higher or greater standard. The source of that higher standard – or the standard itself - would therefore be God – or at least closer to God than the being under consideration. When you compare “god” to a greater standard, or if you are holding on to the notion that “god” may somehow fall short of possessing good that is “unlimited” or total, then you are thinking of a being which is lesser than the true God. Something is causing the limitation to his capacity for good -either some other being or some inherent weakness or lack within him. This being you are thinking of may or may not exist, but you are not yet thinking of God. In other words, if our minds’ ability to discover conceptions has any value, then considering “God” means considering the maximally good being. Otherwise, this exercise in trying to form conceptions should be abandoned as unreliable. But consider, to abandon it as unreliable (which is being suggested when one asserts that we may be tricked by this being) is itself evidence of the underlying program that the mind is operating, as it seeks to find truth (here, that truth cannot be reliably found, which itself would be a truth claim that one wishes to rely upon, thereby contradicting itself).

            It is true that we often subjectively attribute to God characteristics that we happen to like. For example, God would be a good conservative, or God supports the United States. When we do so, we risk getting it wrong. What underlies most of these notions is a sense of what we want most – to live “forever” in health, wealth and comfort, surrounded by loved ones. We were actually meant for that – and someday we will have it again – but this world is not that place. The Christian worldview has much explanatory power in making sense of this – the Fall caused a break from God and we are now being punished. Death is actually the solution, for without death we would be eternally separated from him in bodies which are continuing to run down and decay. This provides little comfort when tragedy strikes, but such feelings do not make the worldview untrue.

            In the end, the challenger’s conclusions flow from that unstated assumption – that life here is supposed to be better than it actually is. He then looks for the cause of the problem, and assumes that the God who left us here may be playing a cruel trick on us. Christianity, by contrast, is grounded in the notion that God is not the problem, we are. We use our minds to discover this truth, and the truth of Christ’s sacrifice for us, and we assent to the repairs that God wants to effect upon us. God’s motives are good, and so are his actions. But it remains up to us to bend our will to his… and not try to accomplish the opposite.

Why Naturalism Lacks Explanatory Power Part II

Presidential Debates, Apologetics, Information and Influence

Most people who regularly engage others in debate or conversation recognize that there’s a difference between information and influence. I certainly don’t want to engage people on a topic without first possessing the proper information; all of us want to speak from a position of informational certainty. But having information alone, even true information, does not guarantee that we will influence those with whom we talk. The recent presidential debates illustrate this reality and provide Christian Case Makers with important lessons.

At the conclusion of each debate, many of us came to very different conclusions about how each candidate performed. We disagreed about what each candidate meant, and the degree to which each candidate was able to influential the nation. Now it is true that some of our opinions were rooted in prior political commitments, but when I encounter someone who wants to talk about the presidential debates, the first thing I ask is, “How did you experience the debate? Did you read it, listen to it, or watch it?” I recognize that people are influenced (whether politically or otherwise) based on how they receive information. If we simply read the transcript of the debate, we’ll miss the important tone and inflection indicators that inform us about the true intention of each speaker. If we simply listen to the debate, we’ll miss all the non-verbal physical indicators that help us understand what was intended by each candidate.

A speaker can possess the correct information; yet still lose the battle of influence. The content of our words is impacted by all the tones, inflections and non-verbal cues that accompany them. In fact, experts believe that “nonverbal communication makes up about two-thirds of all communication.” Informational content alone is not enough; how we deliver information is often more important than what we delivered. This is true for those who engage in political debates and it’s also true for those of use who engage in conversations about our faith. When you’re about to begin a conversation about the things of God, make sure you possess the correct information, then think about these commonly recognized “non-verbal” considerations as you communicate with others:

Am I paying attention to my tone, volume and inflection?

The tone, volume and pitch of my words matter. Have I been consistent in matching these audible characteristics with the content of my speech?

Am I paying attention to my physical distance?

Am I careful not to invade the "personal space" of the person with whom I am talking? Is my distance from him or her appropriate for the level of familiarity I have with this person?

Am I paying attention to my general appearance?

Like it or not, appearances also matter. Am I dressed in a way that connects me to the person with whom I am talking? Does my clothing, hairstyle or physical appearance project an image that helps others embrace or reject what I have to say?

Am I paying attention to my body language?

Before considering specific details related to body movement, there are some important general considerations to address. Am I careful to communicate “openness” and interest, or do I project rigid defensiveness by crossing my arms and legs or slouching?

Am I paying attention to my facial expressions?

Am I smiling appropriately, frowning inappropriately, projecting undue harshness or condescending impatience?

Am I paying attention to my hand gestures?

Are my gestures appropriate? Am I careful not to exaggerate a point with an unnecessary gesture, or do I miss a chance to drive a point home with a small movement?

Am I paying attention to my eye contact?

Do I make eye contact that is appropriate given the nature of the discussion? Am I trying to “stare down” my “opponent” or am I communicating interest and empathy with my eyes?

Am I paying attention to my physical contact?

Am I careful to respect the relationship I have with this person and either resist or utilize the power of appropriate contact to communicate an important point (i.e. touching a shoulder to communicate understanding, etc.)

As I look back at successful interviews (and interrogations) that I’ve conducted with suspects over the years, and as I review the video recordings of these interactions, I realize that most of what I was able to communicate relied on non-verbal actions rather than spoken words. I knew when to inflect a point, when to pause for effect, when to use a facial expression to convey empathy or disbelief and when to use my body language to demonstrate approval or skepticism. None of this would have been available to a jury if all I had were a transcript of the interview. The jury needed to see what I said just as much as they needed to hear or read it. The recent presidential debates were no different. Each candidate came into the debate prepared with information, but their influence resulted from the way they communicated this information with words and with non-verbal modes of communication.

Presidential Debates, Apologetics, Information and Influence

Is Biblical Inerrancy Irrelevant?

Biblical inerrancy may be defined as follows: “when all the facts are known, the Scriptures in their original autographs and properly interpreted will be shown to be wholly true in everything that they affirm, whether that has to do with doctrine or morality or with the social, physical, or life sciences.”[1]

One important element of this definition is that inerrancy only applies to the original autographs. But since we no longer have the original autographs in our possession, the question that begs to be asked is, “Of what use or importance is biblical inerrancy then? Is biblical inerrancy even relevant?” Some liberal theologians conclude that inerrancy is altogether irrelevant. This, in turn, has negatively affected how many Christians view Scripture and the confidence they place in it.

Let’s Get Metaphysical

But my friends this shouldn’t be. Biblical inerrancy is relevant and Scripture commands your confidence. To help explain why this is so, let us consider the distinction commonly made by metaphysicians between word tokens and word types.[2] Consider the following words:

RED BLUE RED

Now reflect on this question: “How many words are there?” The question is ambiguous because there is a sense in which it looks like there are two words (RED and BLUE), and another sense in which it looks like there are three words (RED, BLUE, and RED).  The question receives clarification when we distinguish between word tokens and word types and specify which we are interested in.

If we are asking how many word tokens there are, then we have three: two tokens of the word RED and one token of the word BLUE. A token is an individual, particular kind of thing. It is a specific thing that can only exist in one place at one time. If, on the other hand, we are asking how many word types there are, then we have two: the word type RED and the word type BLUE. A type in this case is a universal. It is repeatable and can be in more than one place at one time. It is the same word.

Back to Biblical Inerrancy

What does this have to do with biblical inerrancy? When liberal theologians or skeptics assert that biblical inerrancy is irrelevant because we do not possess the original autographs they are failing to distinguish between the text tokens and the text type. We do have the original text type, even though we may not possess the original text tokens.

To help think about this further, consider that it is the word as a type that conveys meaning, not the word as a token. When we think of the word as a token we are thinking of it as a material object (i.e., black ink scribbled on a parchment). But when we think of the word as a type, we are thinking of it as a bearer of meaning. It becomes a shareable thing which we can both have in our mind or in a book in front of us.

Now, this is where textual criticism comes into play. When it comes to the text of the New Testament, even though we do not have the original text tokens (the original autographs as material scribbling on parchment), we are able to reconstruct with great certainty approximately 99.5% of the original text type. That is, if textual criticism has done its job, we have good reason to believe that we possess the text type which bears the original meaning of the original text tokens.

Notice now that the issue of biblical inerrancy becomes an epistemic one, i.e., “Do we have good grounds to believe we have the original text in this particular passage?” The concern is no longer with the metaphysical claim which says we could never have the original text. We do have the original text type, just not the original text tokens.

Why Didn’t God Preserve the Originals?

Now the question is often raised, “But why would God allow the original manuscript text tokens (i.e., the original autographs) to be lost?”

Answer: We have greater certainty about what the original text type is by applying textual criticism to the available copies than we would if we had the original text tokens. How so? If Christians claimed to have the original autographs (text tokens), all the skeptic or liberal theologian would need to do is raise doubts regarding how we know those “originals” have not been corrupted or tampered with in the last 2,000 years. Apologists would be very hard-pressed to come up with a convincing answer. In other words, if we as Christians were basing our entire case for the reliability of the New Testament on twenty-seven material objects (the original autographs or text tokens), we would need a very high epistemic case that those material objects have maintained their integrity for the last 2,000 years.

Thanks be to God, this is not the history of our received New Testament text. Instead, God in His wisdom took the originals, and using fallible men to reproduce them, diffused the original text type into thousands of documents that provide a broad epistemic basis for our certainty we have the original. Given this scenario, wholesale change of the text became impossible:

By having the text of the New Testament in particular explode across the known world, ending up in the far-flung corners of the Roman Empire in relatively short order, God protected that text from the one thing we, centuries and millennia later, could never detect: wholesale change of doctrine or theology by one particular man or group who had full control over the text at any one point in its history…there was never a time when anyone or any group could gather up all the manuscripts and make extensive changes in the text itself.[3]

The original text type diffused into thousands of documents could then be reconstructed through the process of textual criticism, allowing us to have great confidence in our New Testament and making the doctrine of biblical inerrancy completely relevant.

Conclusion

So, is biblical inerrancy irrelevant because we do not possess the original autographs? Not at all! Metaphysically, the original text can be present as a type today even if the tokens are gone, and it is the type that matters (not the tokens) because it is the type that carries meaning. Do we have the original text type? That is an epistemic question and we are on more epistemically solid ground regarding the text of the New Testament due to textual criticism than we would be having claimed to have the originals. For 99.5% of our New Testament text is pure and not in question, and the .5% that we are less sure about does not affect any major doctrine or essential teaching of the Christian faith.

Amen.

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[1] Paul D. Feinberg, “The Meaning of Inerrancy,” in Inerrancy, ed. Norman L. Geisler (Grand Rapids: Zondervan, 1980), 294.

[2] I am deeply indebted to Dr. J.P. Moreland for the following insight and commentary, used with his permission.

[3] James R. White, The King James Only Controversy: Can You Trust Modern Translations?, 2^nd ed. (Minneapolis: Bethany, 2009), 77-78.

Is Biblical Inerrancy Irrelevant?